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Software-defined Networking (SDN) enables flexible network management, but as net-
works evolve to a large number of end-points with diverse network policies, higher
speed, and higher utilization, abstraction of networks by SDN makes monitoring and
debugging network problems increasingly harder and challenging. While some prob-
lems impact packet processing in the data plane (e.g., congestion), some cause policy
deployment failures (e.g., hardware bugs); both create inconsistency between opera-
tor intent and actual network behavior. Existing debugging tools are not sufficient to
accurately detect, localize, and understand the root cause of problems observed in a
large-scale networks; either they lack in-network resources (compute, memory, or/and
network bandwidth) or take long time for debugging network problems.
This thesis presents three debugging tools: PathDump, SwitchPointer, and Scout,
and a technique for tracing packet trajectories called CherryPick. We call for a dif-
ferent approach to network monitoring and debugging: in contrast to implementing
debugging functionality entirely in-network, we should carefully partition the debug-
ging tasks between end-hosts and network elements. Towards this direction, we present
CherryPick, PathDump, and SwitchPointer. The core of CherryPick is to cherry-pick the
links that are key to representing an end-to-end path of a packet, and to embed picked
linkIDs into its header on its way to destination.
PathDump is an end-host based network debugger based on tracing packet trajec-
tories, and exploits resources at the end-hosts to implement various monitoring and
debugging functionalities. PathDump currently runs over a real network comprising
only of commodity hardware, and yet, can support surprisingly a large class of net-
work debugging problems with minimal in-network functionality.
The key contributions of SwitchPointer is to efficiently provide network visibility
to end-host based network debuggers like PathDump by using switch memory as a
"directory service" — each switch, rather than storing telemetry data necessary for
debugging functionalities, stores pointers to end hosts where relevant telemetry data is
stored. The key design choice of thinking about memory as a directory service allows
to solve performance problems that were hard or infeasible with existing designs.
Finally, we present and solve a network policy fault localization problem that arises
in operating policy management frameworks for a production network. We develop
Scout, a fully-automated system that localizes faults in a large scale policy deploy-




Data centers have compute, storage, and network infrastructure that house critical on-
line applications like search engine, social networks, and big data applications. Bil-
lions of users all over the world depend on these applications in their day-to-day ac-
tivities. Typically, in a large data center, applications are deployed in hundreds of
thousands of servers and they communicate with each other via thousands of network
devices. In specific, network infrastructure moves a massive amount of data between
compute and storage devices. In such a large network, network problems are inevitable.
Performance degradation of an application due to network problems even for a short
period of time would severely hurts the quality of service. Ideally network operators
want an fully automated debugging tool that consumes minimal resources, easy to use,
and also quickly allows to detect, locate, and fix the network problems. To this end,
we focus on building tools that ease the network operator’s job of debugging network
problems. In this thesis, we study the problems observed in data center networks and
build efficient and scalable tools to debug the problems.
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Today, data centers are a key computing infrastructure that drives the Internet. Nu-
merous services such as search, online social media, big data analytics, and cloud ap-
plications rely on data centers. Information technology giants like Microsoft, Google,
Facebook, and Amazon build and maintain data centers that have hundreds of thou-
sands of servers, thousands of network devices, and storage devices [112]. Using this
infrastructure, a huge amount of data is generated and consumed every day by billions
of users in the globe.
As size of network elements in the data centers grow, Software-Defined Network-
ing (SDN) has emerged as a key technology for managing the network infrastructure.
In SDN, network administrators express their desire to meet application demands as a
network policy and provide the policy to a centralized controller. The controller further
converts policy into low-level per-switch instructions. For example, a routing policy
is converted to low-level forwarding rules (see Figure 1.1), security policy to access
control list (ACL) rules, load balance policy to equal-cost multi-path (ECMP) config-
urations, and quality of service (QoS) policy to per-port priority queue configurations.
Upon receiving the packet, switch data plane makes forwarding decisions based on the
forwarding and ACL rules, and puts the packet into appropriate queue as defined by a
load balance and QoS policy.
In a large complex network environment network problems are inevitable. While
troubleshooting a network problem, operators need to think of multiple possibilities. A
problematic network behavior could be due to many reasons — misconfiguration (e.g.,
incorrect forwarding rules), malfunction of network devices (e.g., faulty interface), or
lack of network resources (e.g., congestion due to buffer overflow), and their combi-
nation. The presence of these problems would create inconsistency between network
1
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Figure 1.1: A policy is compiled to low-level switch rules and configurations. Based
on the rules and configurations, switch data plane makes packet forwarding deci-
sions. However, problems in the data plane (e.g., ECMP collisions, network conges-
tion) cause inconsistency between control plane (A) and actual network behavior.
Similarly, policy deployment failures due to physical-level faults (e.g., TCAM memory
overflow, control channel disruption, etc.) might cause inconsistency between control
plane (A) and switch rules and configurations (B).
admin’s intent and actual network behavior which in-turn triggers spurious events; e.g.,
high job completion times, degradation in quality of search query results, etc.
Ideally network administrators want a fully automated debugging tool — a key
component in self-driving networks — that consumes minimal in-network resources
(e.g., switch cpu, switch memory, and network bandwidth) for monitoring and allows
to debug a large class of network problems. Moreover, it should allows to detect,
localize, inspect, and fix the problems at fine-time scales in the order of milliseconds
to seconds.
Monitoring and debugging network problems is complex. There have been many
recent systems (e.g., Trumpet [71], EverFlow [112], PathQuery [75] Marple [74]) for
debugging network problems. While each of these works has different approach, de-
bugging problems observed in a large-scale network still remains challenging. More-
over, as data centers evolve to a large number of end-points (> 100k), diverse network
policies (routing, security, and QoS), higher utilization (aggregate traffic can exceed
100Tbps), and higher speed (10/40/100G), monitoring and debugging become more
challenging.
To better understand the nature of network problems, we have investigated prob-
lems handled in many recent works and broadly divided them into two categories.
First category has the network problems in the switch data plane that impact packet
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processing. Moreover, these problems cannot be detected at a centralized point either
by analyzing network policies or corresponding switch configurations, but their pres-
ence impact actual network behavior in the data plane (C in Figure 1.1). Some example
problems are load imbalance due to ECMP poor hashing [12], random packet drops by
a faulty interface [112], etc.
Second category has the problems that cause the inconsistency between control
plane policy and low-level per-switch rules and configurations. The inconsistency be-
tween the policy and the network state could be detected at a centralized controller
either by continuously monitoring updates pushed to the network [60], or by period-
ically collecting and analyzing the rules and configurations [66] such as routing con-
figurations, switch table rules, etc. However, it is hard to localize and find the root
cause that creates such inconsistency. Some possible causes are errors in routing or
security policy compilation, control channel disruption, device memory overflow, and
their combination.
This thesis presents three debugging tools PathDump, SwitchPointer, and Scout,
and also a packet trajectory tracing technique called CherryPick. While CherryPick,
PathDump and SwitchPointer together enables debugging a large class of network prob-
lems in the data plane (first category), Scout is an end-to-end system that localizes
failures and also pinpoints the cause for a failure in a large-scale policy deployment
(second category). Note, the tools do not target “automated” debugging but rather
allows to build a framework to simplify the debugging process, and enables network
operators to quickly detect, localize, and understand the cause for a large class of net-
work problems.
1.1 Problems and contributions
This section provides discussion on the two problems addressed in this thesis. It covers
recent works in network debugging, their limitations, and outlines the thesis contribu-
tions.
Problem 1: Existing systems are insufficient to monitor and debug network problems
in the data plane. Debugging requires both network visibility and resources to capture
the visibility.
Managing large-scale networks is complex. Even short-lived problems due to fail-
ures, load imbalance, faulty hardware and software bugs can severely impact perfor-
mance and revenue [44, 71, 112].
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Existing tools to monitor and debug network problems operate at one of the two
extremes. On the one hand, proposals for in-network monitoring argue for capturing
telemetry data (e.g., flowIDs, packet headers) at switches [13, 63, 107, 64, 50], and
querying this data using new switch interfaces [74, 41, 75, 6] and hardware [51, 74].
Such in-network approaches provide visibility into the network that may be necessary
to debug a class of network problems; however, these approaches are often limited by
data plane resources (switch memory and/or network bandwidth) and thus have to rely
on sampling or approximate counters which are not accurate enough for monitoring
and diagnosing many network problems (§6.2).
At the other extreme are recent systems [71, 44] that use end-hosts to collect and
monitor telemetry data, and to use this data to debug spurious network events. The
motivation behind such end-host based approaches is two-fold [71]. First, hosts not
only have more available resources than switches but also already need to process
packets; thus, monitoring and debugging functionalities can potentially be integrated
within the packet processing pipeline with little additional overhead. Second, hosts
offer the programmability [71] needed to implement various monitoring and debugging
functionalities without any specialized hardware. While well-motivated, such purely
end-host based approaches lose the benefits of network visibility offered by in-network
approaches.
Contributions. This thesis calls for a radically different approach for network mon-
itoring and debugging: in contrast to implementing the debugging functionalities en-
tirely in-network or at end-hosts, we should carefully partition the debugging tasks
between end-hosts and network elements. This approach not only reduces the over-
head on network resources, but also allows to debug the problems one can see the
other cannot.
Towards this direction, this thesis presents CherryPick, PathDump, and SwitchPointer,
all three together integrates the best of two worlds — resources and programmability
of end-hosts, and network visibility offered by the network elements. CherryPick is
a scalable, yet simple technique for tracing packet trajectories in SDN-enabled data
center networks. The main idea is instead of picking every link that a packet traverse
towards the destination, CherryPick exploits common data center network topologies
like fat-tree, VL2, and selectively chooses the links that are sufficient to represent the
end-to-end path. More details of CherryPick can be found in Chapter 4 and §5.3.1.
PathDump is an end-host based network debugger that exploits resources and pro-
grammability of end-hosts to collect and store telemetry data necessary for debugging
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network problems. In addition, each individual end-host also expose query service
that allows PathDump to filter telemetry data stored across multiple end-hosts in a dis-
tributed manner. PathDump design is based on tracing packet trajectories using link
sampling technique like CherryPick. Visibility at each individual end-host, along with
path information provided by CherryPick allows PathDump to debug a large class of
network problems (present in C of Figure 1.1) with minimal in-network functionality
(see Table 5.2 for the supported problems). More details of PathDump can be found in
Chapter 5.
Although end-hosts in PathDump know paths of every packet they receive, and
debugs problems for which path information is sufficient, PathDump still losses the
in-network visibility, thus unable to debug a class of performance problems. For in-
stance, hosts cannot localize (e.g., specific switch in the path) and understand the cause
(e.g., contending flows and packets) of a spurious event (e.g., latency, packet drops).
SwitchPointer efficiently enable network visibility to end-host based monitoring sys-
tems like PathDump by using switch memory as a "directory service" — in contrast to
in-network approaches where switches store telemetry data [75, 74, 107] necessary to
diagnose network problems, SwitchPointer switches store pointers to end-hosts where
the relevant telemetry data is stored. The distributed storage at switches thus operates
as a distributed directory service; when an end-host triggers a spurious network event,
SwitchPointer uses the distributed directory service to quickly filter the data (potentially
distributed across multiple end-hosts) necessary to debug the event. The key design
choice of thinking about network switch storage as a directory service rather than a
data store allows to efficiently solve many problems that are hard or even infeasible for
existing systems. More details of SwitchPointer can be found in Chapter 6.
Discussion on the supported network problems, that is, coverage of CherryPick,
PathDump and SwitchPointer can be found athttps://github.com/PathDump/
Applications.
Problem 2: Debugging network policy deployment failures takes time.
A number of frameworks (e.g.., PGA [82] APIC [15], Merlin [92], Frenetic [41],
Pyretic [69], GBP [9]) aid network policy management tasks through abstraction, pol-
icy composition, and deployment. However, these frameworks are not immune to vari-
ous faulty situations that can rise from misconfiguration [60], software bugs, hardware
failure [112, 44], etc. Many of them incur a flow of instructions from a centralized
controller, to a software agent in a network device and finally to ternary content ad-
dressable memory (TCAM) in that device. A failure of any element in this data flow
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or at physical-level can significantly disturb the network policy deployment process.
Typically, policy management frameworks [82, 15] represent the intent of network
admins using policy objects (in short, objects) such as marketing group, DB tier, filter,
and so on. When a network policy is not rendered in the network (e.g., a large number
of low-level TCAM rules are missing) admins observe a large number of failure noti-
fications. So, admins should first understand which part (set of objects) of the policy
has been affected. Today, it is challenging to localize because the low-level rules is the
final outcome after compilation of a large number of policy objects and their inter de-
pendencies. So, admins can end up spending lot of time examining tens of thousands
of low-level rules to localize a small set of objects that become faulty due to failures
— a needle-in-a-haystack problem. Therfore, admins require a fully-automated means
that quickly nail down to the part of the policy they should look into or further diagnose
in order to fix a large number of observed failures.
There have been many recent works [59, 60, 66] on detecting inconsistency be-
tween high-level network policy (A in Figure 1.1) at the controller and low-level table
entries and configurations (B in Figure 1.1). But, localization and identifying the root
cause for inconsistency between A and B which is as equally important as detecting
inconsistency is understudied. In specific, an ideal debugging tool should localize
high-level faulty policy object (in A) that the operator should dig deeper (to fix the
problem), and also provide most likely root cause (e.g., physical-level failure) for the
objects to become faulty.
Contribution. We call the problem of finding out the impaired parts of the policy as
a network policy fault localization problem. This thesis presents Scout, an end-to-end
system that automatically pinpoints not only faulty policy objects, but also physical-
level failures; the cause for policy objects becoming faulty. We tackle it via risk
modeling [62]; risks are modeled as simple bipartite graphs that capture dependen-
cies between risks (i.e., objects) and nodes (e.g., endpoints or end user applications)
in low-level rules. We then annotate the risk models for those risks and nodes that are
associated with the observed failures. Using those models, we devise a greedy fault
localization algorithm that outputs a hypothesis, a minimum set of most-likely faulty
policy objects (i.e., risks) that explains most of the observed failures. More details in
Chapter 7.
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1.2 Thesis organization
This thesis is organized into the following chapters.
Chapter 2 provides background on the data center network environment. It also
explains how network problems degrades performance of applications, and technical
challenges in debugging those problems.
Chapter 3 discusses related work on network monitoring and debugging. It pro-
vides shortcomings of the existing approaches, and how CherryPick, PathDump, SwitchPointer,
and Scout fill the gap.
Chapter 4 presents CherryPick, a packet trajectory tracing technique operates in
L2/L3 layer. CherryPick works for common data center topologies like fat-tree and
VL2 that contains commodity OpenFlow compatible switches, and requires no changes
to hardware. This chapter is based on work published in ACM SIGCOMM SOSR,
2015.
Chapter 5 presents PathDump, an end-host based network debugger that simplifies
network debugging and enables debugging a large class of network problems with
minimal in-network functionality. It explains the details of PathDump design (§5.2),
implementation (§5.3), and example applications (§5.4). This chapter is based on the
work published in USENIX OSDI, 2016.
Chapter 6 presents SwitchPointer, a distributed network monitoring and debugging
tool. The key contribution of SwitchPointer is to enable network visibility to end-host
based monitoring approaches like PathDump. It explains the details of SwitchPointer
design (§6.4), implementation, and a few SwitchPointer usecases (§6.5). This chapter
is based on the work published in USENIX NSDI, 2018.
Chapter 7 presents Scout, an end-to-end system that localizes the policy objects
become faulty due to policy deployment failures and also pin-points the root cause
for the object become faulty in-terms of physical-level failures. More details on risk
models (§7.3), a greedy-based fault localization algorithm (§7.4), and the Scout system
(§7.5) can be found in this chapter. This chapter is based on the work to appear in IEEE
ICDCS, 2018.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. It outlines areas of future work and key contribu-
tions of this thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter discusses the data center network environment, a few physical-level faults
observed in production networks, and some challenging problems that draw the atten-
tion of the data center networking community.
2.1 The data center environment
Network role in a data center. Many applications deployed in data centers expect
non-blocking communication between their compute and storage servers. So, network
in a data center moves data traffic between the servers that run both delay-sensitive
(e.g., web search) and bandwidth-intensive applications (e.g., big data).
To better understand the network role inside a data center, consider how a search
query might work. When a user makes a search query, the query hits a server in a
data center. This server might query several other servers, which communicate with
several other servers and so on. Responses from the individual servers are collated,
and the final search response is sent to the user. For one query, there might be a large
number of server to server interactions, and deadline of each interaction could be as
small as 10ms [20]. This kind of communication pattern is referred to as scatter-gather
or partition-aggregation.
Scatter-gather is not exclusive to the search. Similar communication pattern is
observed while loading web pages. For instance, a recent study in Facebook data
center [78] while loading a popular web page shows that there are 521 internal requests
on average, at 95 percentile, internal requests are over 1700. Further, data centers
often run big data analytics tools such as Hadoop, Spark, and Database joins, which
all process data to provide a response to queries. These big data processing tools move
massive amounts of data around.
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Figure 2.1: 4-ary fat-tree topology
Workloads. Broadly, the applications and their flow sizes can be categorized into
three types [20]: query traffic (2KB to 20KB), latency sensitive short messages (1MB
to 100MB), and throughput sensitive long flows (longer than 100MB). Some example
applications are: ARP, DNS (latency sensitive); hadoop, spark, and database joins (la-
tency and throughput sensitive); VM migration, and large size file transfers (throughput
sensitive).
Multi-rooted tree topologies. Data center networks are built based on scale-out archi-
tectures that consist of switches in multiple layers. For instance, consider fat-tree [17]
network topology. It has switches at three layers: top of rack (ToR), aggregate and
core. Hosts are connected to a ToR switch, a group of ToR switches is connected to an
aggregate switch, and finally, a core switch connects a group of aggregate switches. A
K-ary fat-tree topology has K pods; a pod has K/2 ToR and K/2 aggregate switches.
K/2 ports of a ToR switch are connected to end-hosts, and the remaining K/2 ports are
connected to K/2 aggregate switches in the same pod. Furthermore the other (K/2)
aggregate switch ports are connected to (K/2) core switches.
To meet application demands, in some cases, switches are configured to forward an
end-host pair traffic across multiple paths. For example, in a K-ary fat-tree topology
there are (K/2)2 equal length shortest paths between any source-destination pair (for
K=48, there are 576 shortest paths [17]).
Equal-cost multi-path (ECMP). Switches configured with ECMP load balance traffic
among equal cost paths [18]. In specific, for each incoming packet a switch applies
hash on header fields (e.g., 5-tuple flow ID) and generates a key. The Key space is
divided equally by the number of possible output ports. In other words, each divided
region in the key space is mapped to one output port. If the packet’s key falls into one
of the subregions, then the port mapped to the region is selected as the next hop.
Software-Defined Networking (SDN). In conventional network switches, the control
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logic is co-located with the switching logic [26]. Therefore, a network policy is re-
alized by configuring individual switches. But as the size of the network increases,
managing box by box becomes hard. SDN makes network management easier. It de-
couples the network control plane (brain) from the data plane (forwarding engine) [26];
the control logic is separated from the switches and moved to a centralized controller.
This way SDN abstracts underlying network infrastructure complexity, and the SDN
applications program the network treating it as a single logical entity (one big switch).
Some key network management applications that drive SDN are: 1) VLAN configu-
ration during VM migration [43]; 2) Quick allocation of network resources to meet
user application demands; and 3) Enforcement of policies like QoS, isolation, and se-
curity [56].
Commodity switches. Large-scale data center networks primarily use low-cost com-
modity switches that have limited resources [17]. These switches should process pack-
ets in nano seconds to keep up with high-speed line rates (e.g., 10Gbps, 40Gbps and
more). To enable fast look up, switches store the state required (lookup tables) for for-
warding packets in expensive and power-hungry memories (SRAM and TCAM), and
these memories are limited in size due to cost and power constraints.
In general, SRAM stores look-up tables that have entries similar to key-value
pairs [63]. For example, a set of destination MAC addresses is assigned to a particular
interface [43]. When an incoming packet’s destination matches any particular entry, it
is forwarded to the assigned interface. Similarly, TCAM stores wild-card entries, each
entry can have don’t care values, either 1 or 0. Typically, access control list (ACL)
rules that allow, discard, or rate-limit packets are stored in TCAM. Note, TCAM is
more expensive and consumes more power than SRAM.
Despite the fact that switch memory is costly and limited, operators want to fully
utilize the memory (store a large number of entries to route traffic). If some applica-
tions need different QoS and access control, it requires even more memory. Likewise,
monitoring functionality also require memory resources [74, 63] to maintain counters,
flow statistics, etc.
Strict limits on per-packet operations and limited available memory make it hard
to maintain a set of active flows at the merchant silicon. There is limited time on
each packet to spend; only 12 ns to process a 64 byte packet arrive on a 40Gbps port.
Modern on chip SRAM has about 1 ns access time. Assuming the whole 12 ns is
assigned to monitoring, it is still challenging to do SRAM lookup, perform a few ALU
operations, and write back within the given time budget [63].
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End-host networking. Many recent works instrumented end-hosts in data centers to
enable multiple network related tasks [32, 97, 55]; e.g., congestion control, tunneling,
access control, monitoring, and debugging. Some of the key motivations for involv-
ing end-hosts are: (1) Availability of computation power, memory, and storage; (2)
Higher visibility into the behavior of applications it hosts with little overhead; and (3)
Complete control of datacenter-wide network, storage, and compute resources under a
single administrative domain [106, 97, 71].
2.2 Network data plane faults
This section describes a few data plane faults observed in the production data cen-
ters, and the challenges to diagnose these problems with existing debugging tools.
CherryPick, PathDump and SwitchPointer system designs are motivated to address these
problems.
Silent packet drops. It is challenging to localize the culprit switch silently dropping
packets. This could be because of a faulty interface dropping a fraction of packets at
random [112], or bit flaps in a switch fabric module [44]. Such type of faults cause
performance degradation (due to high TCP retransmissions) to network-wide flows
passing through the faulty switch.
Furthermore, the higher the level of the faulty switch in the network topology, the
more severe in-terms of number of flows or applications would suffer. With hundreds
of switches in the network and multiple equal-cost paths between a source-destination
pair, localizing the faulty switch or link is not trivial. Conventional tools like ping and
trace-route may not observe the problems encountered by actual traffic. So, operators
have to run the tests from multiple places, infer the rough location, and inspect indi-
vidual switches in the location. Because there is a large number of links (e.g., 25,000),
using these tools to localize the problem has significant overhead and can take several
hours [112].
Silent blackhole. It is a type of routing blackhole that does not show up in forwarding
tables. For example, a forwarding table entry in the switch TCAM is corrupted [112].
It may cause packets with a specific source-destination IP address pair or source desti-
nation port numbers to be dropped [44]. Such faults cannot be detected by examining
switch forwarding tables. To illustrate the impact of the fault, suppose that a faulty
switch is present in one of the multiple paths between a pair of end-hosts. Oper-
ators might observe some requests between the end-hosts are success, while others
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fail [112]. Unless the operators look into all possible paths and every switch present in
those paths, the faulty switch cannot be easily localized. Therefore, debugging a silent
blackhole is as challenging as the silent random packet drop problem.
ECMP load imbalance. ECMP load imbalance due to poor hashing [12] would de-
grades application performance. Even though, load imbalance can be detected after
looking at the difference between interface counters using tools like SNMP link moni-
tor, the coarse-grained interface counters are not sufficient to understand the root cause
of load imbalance. Debugging load imbalance requires fine-grained telemetry data
(e.g., contending flows, packet headers) in fine time-scales (e.g., order of milliseconds
to seconds)
For instance, it is essential for network operators to distinguish between two possi-
ble causes for the load imbalance: Is there a hardware bug causing ECMP poor hashing
on flow tuple, or is there any particular application that sends a sudden burst of traf-
fic on a particular interface that lead to an imbalance between two interface counters.
To find out answers, first the operator needs to know which flows (and their sizes)
contribute to those counters. In other words, per-flow statistics (5-tuple flow ID, and
its size) at regular intervals is essential to the operator to make a right decision (re-
configure ECMP function or limit application bandwidth rate). However, maintaining
flow-level visibility comes at the cost of per-packet operations that require additional
CPU and memory resources [75, 74, 63].
Inflated end-to-end latency. Many datacenter applications have tight deadlines on
flow completion times (e.g., 1 ms per network tier [112]). But packet delays due to
queue build-up at a single switch, or at multiple switches en-route to the destination
may miss the completion deadlines. Troubleshooting end-to-end latency is challeng-
ing. For instance, consider in-network load balancing technique like ECMP is active.
There is no easy way to identify the set of links or switches that a packet has traversed.
Even in a case where the links traversed by a packet are known in advance, a link
could be shared by multiple flows. If there is a hash collision, it is hard to tell which
flows are contributing to large queue size [74]. Such fine-grained visibility is essential
to understand the root cause of the delay. However, conventional tools like traceroute
are not sufficient to debug latency problems mainly because of two reasons: First,
the RTT inferred from the test packets could be different from what original packet has
encountered. Second, since the test packet is handled by the switch CPU, RTT could be
inflated by the control plane, therefore inferred RTT could be noisy or unusable [112].
Chapter 2. Background 13
2.3 Flow contention
Many recent studies on application communication patterns showed that multiple flows
contend for the same outgoing port. Contention causes congestion that eventually
inflates flow completion time (due to packet loss, time outs, etc). There have been
numerous works that proposed ways to mitigate contention; e.g., changes to end-host
congestion control mechanisms [84], efficient scheduling at switches [68], dynamic
path changes [18, 21, 19, 57], and coordination between switches and end-hosts [20].
However, as applications evolve, network operators may see new traffic patterns, and
need to update prior contention control techniques. This section provides discussion on
three popular application communication patterns that effect application performance
and solutions proposed to mitigate the collisions.
ECMP collisions. Despite the load balancing, the main drawback of ECMP technique
is collisions due to the stateless behavior of hashing technique [18]. Since data cen-
ter commodity switches have shallow buffers, collision of big flows (i.e., flows that
occupy a significant bandwidth of link capacity) on the same outgoing port quickly
fill the queue buffers, in-turn causes packet drops. Moreover, a collision of big flows
and latency-sensitive small flows adds more queuing delay to small flow packets. For
example, if two flows contending (i.e. due to hash collision) for a single output link
with capacity 1Gbps, there will be 50% throughput loss for each flow.
One idea is to collect flow information from the switches and avoid ECMP col-
lisions by scheduling heavy hitter flows over other under-utilized paths [18]. An al-
ternative approach is to detect heavy flow from endhost socket logs [32] and alarm
intermediate switches about the flow. This technique reduces monitoring overhead on
switches and helps to detect heavy flow before it become significant.
TCP in-cast. To handle latency-sensitive queries efficiently, certain data center ap-
plications follow partition-aggregation communication pattern. Some example appli-
cations are social media, web queries, and big data. Typically, the communication
tree for these applications has non-leaf aggregate nodes and leaf worker nodes. Re-
quested queries are first handled by a set of aggregate nodes, which in-turn distribute
requests among worker nodes present in next level. If there is any unexpected delay
in the response from any worker, a timeout occurs that eventually reduces the quality
of final results. Specifically, during the aggregate phase, all flows carrying responses
are directed towards a single output port to which the aggregate node is connected.
The switch buffer suddenly overflows and the switch drops packets. In the worst case,
Chapter 2. Background 14
packet drops not only degrade application performance, but also under utilize the link
capacity. This classic problem is named as TCP in-cast [20], and many works that
includes DCTCP [20], CONGA [19], and pFabric [21]) provide solutions to address
the problem.
TCP outcast. Another problem observed in application communication pattern is TCP
outcast [83]. When a large set of tcp flows and a small set of tcp flows arrive on dif-
ferent switch ports and contend for the same output port, packet loss due to port black-
out (common in commodity switches) preferentially cause timeouts for a small set of
flows. This is due to the fact that consecutive packet drops have more performance
impact on the small set of flows as they lose the tail of entire congestion window and
result in a timeout, eventually creating unfairness for the flows present in the small set.
2.4 Summary
This chapter provides background on the data center network environment, explains
a representative network faults in the data plane, and describes flow-level contention
observed at the network switches. In the next chapter, we present related work on mon-
itoring and debugging network problems introduced in this Chapter and Section 1.1.
Chapter 3
Related work
In this chapter, Section 3.1 discusses in-network debugging systems using complex
in-network techniques. Next, Section 3.2 elaborates on why the existing monitoring
solutions are either hard or infeasible to debug network problems. Finally, Section 3.3
discusses most related work on fault localization problems in the literature.
3.1 In-network debugging
Many existing debugging tools have incorporated increasingly complex in-network
techniques. The idea of in-network techniques is to exploit programmable switches to
capture debugging information at switches and then send it to a centralized collector
to do further analysis and debug the network problems. This Section illustrates the
complexity of the existing in-network techniques.
Data plane snapshots. Several recent works [59, 66, 60] have proposed to take a
snapshot of the entire data plane state, build models, and analyze (by checking various
conditions) this in the background for network debugging purposes. The data plane
state includes switch forwarding tables, ACLs, routing configurations, etc. However,
collecting the network state in a consistent manner may require freezing the entire
network, take a snapshot and then unfreeze the network, which is hard. Moreover,
these works do not deal with debugging problems occur while processing packets in
the data plane like network congestion, silent packet drops, silent black holes etc.
Per-switch per-packet logs. Dataplane snapshots can be avoided by collecting packet
logs for every packet at every switch [47]. Thus, one can analyze these logs to debug
both persistent (e.g., reachability) and transient network problems (e.g., packet drops).
Suppose that 1000 byte packet traverses five switches and each log is 40 bytes, then for
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each packet, you are generating 200 bytes of data. If traffic is 100Tbps, then log gen-
eration requires 20 Tbps of additional network bandwidth. Therefore, this technique
has high bandwidth overhead.
Packet sampling and mirroring. Bandwidth overhead can be greatly reduced by
selectively sampling packets [85, 112, 11]. We can generate packet logs only for those
sampled packets or in fact, there is some technique to completely mirror the entire
packet to be able to do a more in-depth analysis. However, the question is which
packets to sample? For example, consider one of the network problems we mentioned
earlier, the silent random packet drop case. If the switch is dropping one out of 1000
packets in a flow, unless we sample exactly that packet the switch is dropping, we will
not be able to debug the problem. Since these are random packet drops, figuring out
which packet to sample is not trivial.
Everflow [112] selectively mirrors traffic to reduce storage and processing over-
head. In specific, Everflow traces flows by capturing only control packets (e.g., TCP-
SYN packet) assuming that subsequent data packets follow the same path of the control
packets. Furthermore, it uses a guided probing technique; carefully injects test pack-
ets with customized headers to match with a specific match-action rule. However, the
functionality implemented at the network elements (precisely the elements that these
tools are trying to debug) is even more complex.
Dynamic rule updates. In contrast to previously discussed tools, a class of tools [75]
executes SQL-like queries on switches while storing the query state in the packet
header. However, it has the complexity of dynamic rule installations in order to ex-
ecute a query such as adding or deleting flow rules across multiple switches.
Packet probes. Another line of work sends packet probes [16, 109, 44] into the net-
work and infers what went wrong with the original packets from the performance of
the probed packets. For instance, pingmesh [44] leverages all servers to launch TCP
or HTTP pings to provide maximum latency measurement coverage. The measured
latency data is collected and analyzed while troubleshooting performance problems.
Similarly, ATPG [109] sends test packets to check liveness properties such as reach-
ability failures (due to link faults, missing forward entry, etc.) and throughput degra-
dation (due to network congestion). However, test packet generation is insufficient
to debug transient problems like poor ECMP hash collisions, load imbalance, silent
random packet drop, etc., that require per-packet visibility.
Networks are complex because of its scale, complex dependencies, and diverse
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network policies to be enforced. Existing in-network debugging tools have incorpo-
rated increasingly complex techniques on an already complex network. In contrast,
we propose PathDump, a simple end-host based network debugger for data center net-
works. With PathDump, there is no collection of dataplane snapshots, no per-packet
per-switch logs, no packet sampling, no packet mirroring, no active probing, and no
dynamic switch rule installation. PathDump, by pushing much of the network debug-
ging functionality to the end-hosts, it gives up on a small class of network debugging
problems (more details in Chapter 5), while executing debugging with high accuracy
at fine-grained time-scales with low overhead.
3.2 Distributed network monitoring
Traditionally, flow-level network monitoring supports vital network management tasks
such as traffic engineering, anomaly detection, accounting, understanding traffic struc-
ture, detecting worms, scans and botnet activities. As data centers evolve, to meet
network service level agreements (SLAs) of user applications, operator needs to add
more management and debugging tasks to the list. This ever-growing list of tasks ne-
cessitates fine-grained visibility at packet-level, this is in contrast to sampled flow-level
information provided by many popular monitoring tools like NetFlow and sFlow. To
this end, there have been many recent proposals that capture telemetry data at packet-
level using new data structures at switches [107, 63], and query this data using new
switch software or hardware interfaces [74, 75]. But, as network evolves in-terms of
speed, utilization, and diverse policies, monitoring and debugging network problems
become more challenging.
Switch data structures. Typically, network flow monitoring involves per-packet oper-
ations; hash function calculation on 5-tuple, memory (SRAM) lookup, run a few ALU
operations, and write to memory (update counters). But, for high-speed interfaces (e.g.,
40 Gbps), processor and memory for updating flow entry cannot keep up with the line
rate. To be more precise, at 40 Gbps rate, a packet has to be processed in 12 ns. This
is challenging, because packet processing involves stages such as packet header pars-
ing, layer 2/3 forwarding, ACL, etc., in addition to monitoring tasks. Therefore, Cisco
introduced sampled NetFlow [13] to reduce overhead, where 1 out of N packets is
sampled. When using sampled NetFlow, the actual counts are estimated by multiply-
ing with N.
Following this idea and respecting the resource constraints, many sophisticated
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inference techniques with some guarantees on accuracy are proposed. Initial works
embrace approximation techniques that trade off accuracy for switch memory. These
techniques can be broadly divided into two categories: (1) packet sampling [89, 90,
38, 37]; and (2) task-specific measurements [101, 38, 107, 63, 50]. The next two
paragraphs discuss these techniques.
The idea of packet sampling is to sample a subset of packets with some probabil-
ity, aggregate sampled packets, then generate reports. Researchers observed [38] large
portion of traffic is occupied by small percentage of large flows, and the key manage-
ment tasks such as traffic engineering and accounting need such flow statistics. Since,
packet sampling is biased towards large flows, the probability of sampling small flow
packets is very low, therefore it offers inadequate accuracy to many management tasks
that rely on small flow statistics like anomaly detection, scans, etc.
With the goal to improve flow monitoring coverage, cSamp [89] proposed a frame-
work for network-wide flow monitoring. The main idea is to assign a hash range to
each switch, such that, if hash value of a flow (based on 5-tuple) key that is extracted
from the packet fall in the hash range assigned to the switch, then the switch monitor
(maintain counters) that flow. Furthermore, a different hash range is assigned to each
switch. Thus, same flow is not sampled by more than one switch. This way the re-
sources distributed across the switches allows to monitor a more number of flows, thus
more coverage.
Another way to address the limitations of packet sampling techniques is with task-
oriented monitoring. The broad idea is to share available memory among a set of
measurement tasks, and only monitor the traffic relevant to the task at line rate. This
is possible using data streaming [101, 38] or sketch algorithms [107, 50] designed to
address particular tasks such as flow-size distribution, super spreader, heavy hitters,
etc.
But task-oriented approaches lack generality and also make it harder for network
equipment vendors to realize it in practice. It is due to this fact that, early commit-
ment is necessary for designing hardware and hard to modify in future. Moreover,
recent sketch-based solutions [107, 63, 50, 64] have a fundamental trade-off between
measurement accuracy and resource usage, being inappropriate to debug problems that
require more switch resources and high accuracy.
In contrast to the above techniques, SwitchPointer switches only stored pointers to
end-hosts to locate telemetry data for monitoring and debugging. Thus, SwitchPointer
requires minimal switch resources (4-6 MB of SRAM and 1-2 Mbps of bandwidth
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between the control plane and data plane), but can still debug network problems that
are hard or infeasible by sketch or stream-based approaches.
Switch interfaces. A body of work defines programming abstractions [75, 41, 45, 69]
for network monitoring. These approaches enable flow monitoring by installing flow
level rules either in forwarding tables or separate tables. For instance, PathQuery [75]
supports network debugging by dynamically installing switch flow rules, and run SQL-
like queries on these switches. But the problem is operators need to know in advance
the network problems that they wish to monitor. Without prior knowledge, it is hard to
obtain relevant monitoring data.
Switch hardware. Some recent works [6, 51] is quite similar to SwitchPointer (more
details in Chapter 6) in that they use network switches to embed telemetry data (in-
put port, output port, queue size, etc) into the packet header. The embedded data is
extracted at the end-points (e.g., edge swtiches, end-hosts), used later to debug net-
work problems by executing queries on the data distributed across all end-points. The
key difference between these approaches and SwitchPointer is that SwitchPointer can
locate the useful telemetry data easily but they have to search for it across all the end-
points in the network, unless all the data are centrally collected, which is prohibitively
expensive.
Another recent work Marple [74] programs switch hardware that allows to install
predicates (e.g., Does a packet observed high queuing delays?). The predicates are
checked against each incoming packet directly on the switch data plane. When a pred-
icate is satisfied at a switch, it reports telemetry data necessary for debugging the prob-
lem to an analyzer. However, if a network problem occurs due to spurious events (e.g.,
delay) distributed across multiple switches, then Marple cannot debug the problem.
For example, if a packet is delayed for 10 msec distributed across multiple switches
in its path, then the switch close to the destination detects the problem and reports to
analyzer. But we cannot debug the cause for delay since it requires telemetry data of
contending flows and packets at other switches in the packet’s path. Moreover, Marple
requires processing and memory resources to execute installed predicates. The amount
of required resources varies for each predicate.
End-host monitoring. Several recent proposals have advocated moving the monitor-
ing functionality to the edge-points [28, 71, 106]. SNAP [106] logs events (e.g., TCP
statistics and socket-calls) at the end-hosts to infer network problems. Hone [97] stud-
ied host-network traffic management by deploying user-defined programs onto end-
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hosts. These programs monitor local traffic at an end-host, and transmit the required
data for management tasks running on a centralized controller. Trumpet [71] proposes
to push the debugging functionality to the end-host. Specifically, the end-host agent
in trumpet inspects every single packet at line rate, and checks a wide set of events.
Finally, Felix [28] proposed a declarative query language for end-host based network
measurement.
While end-host based approaches work well in monitoring application performance
due to lack of visibility into network core, they are insufficient to accurately debug tran-
sient performance problems (e.g., latency, packet loss). On the contrary, SwitchPointer
has knowledge of two worlds — application performance at end-hosts, and fine-grained
visibility of contending flows and packets in the network at millisecond level timescale.
Therefore, operators can relate application performance drop with network events and
better understand the root cause. In fact, since SwitchPointer rely on end-host based
network monitoring like PathDump and Trumpet, it can benefit by adopting features
(e.g., timely triggering mechanisms in Trumpet [71]) from those systems.
3.3 Fault localization in network policy deployment
A large body of research work has been conducted for network fault localization [62,
53, 23, 72, 34, 54, 61, 94]. Most of them focus on failures involving physical com-
ponents such as fiber-optic cable disruption, interface faults, system crash, etc., in ISP
networks where network components are not necessarily under a single administra-
tion. At a high level, these fault localization approaches have a trade-off between
accuracy [62] and computation overhead [23, 53].
ISP networks. SCORE [62] used risk models and greedy approximation based fault
localization algorithms to identify faulty components in ISP networks. The failure data
collected from the network can have either noise or lack all necessary information, thus
it requires ad hoc thresholds to overcome the negative impact on the accuracy of the
proposed algorithms. Unlike SCORE, sherlock [23, 53] captured the noise or miss-
ing data with probabilistic dependencies between the graph nodes, and then inference
mechanisms such as bayesian [93] or belief propagation [94] are applied to identify
the most likely root causes for network-wide faults. [95] provide an extensive study
of these inference based approaches. A hybrid approach, Gestalt [72], leverages both
approaches (greedy and bayesian) and offers an accurate and lower overhead solution
for specific applications.
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On the contrary, Scout focus is on fault localization of the network policy configu-
ration process in multi-tenant data center networks driven by network policies. Thus,
the context of Scout is quite different from that of these prior works. Also, the infor-
mation and properties captured by the models address the problems that are different
from ISP networks. Unlike Scout, many of these approaches do not scale well beyond
a few nodes (more than 50) in the network [81].
Enterprise and data center networks. As mentioned before in Section 3.1, many
recent works [58, 66, 59] collect data plane snapshots, checks the consistency between
the control plane policy and data plane configurations (e.g., per-switch routing rules,
ACL rules, etc). While, these works goal is to detect the inconsistency between the
control plane policy and the data plane configurations, Scout goal is to localize, and
find the root cause of such inconsistency. In other words, Scout takes output of these
systems as one of the inputs, analyzes, and helps the operators in two aspects: (1)
nails down to the part of the policy that the operator should look at to fix the observed
failures (or inconsistency); and (2) infers the most likely physical-level root cause for
the inconsistency.
Most recent work on network provenance systems [111, 27] keeps track of events
associated with packets and rules, while Scout only compares network policies with
actual rules deployed in the network.
Other works [82, 15, 41, 69, 92, 39, 56] focus on the automation of conflict-free,
error-free composition and deployment of network policies to reduce the likelihood of
network problem occurrences. While these frameworks are greatly useful in managing
network policies, it is hard to completely shield their management plane from fail-
ure, which may cause the inconsistency between the policies and the actual network
state. Scout can identify the impacted network policies. Thus, Scout can be useful in
reinstating the network policies when these frameworks may not work correctly.
3.4 Summary
This chapter presented related work on network monitoring, network debugging, and
network fault localization. To summarize, networks are complex, and the tools to de-
bug these networks are even more complex. In-network monitoring approaches offer
network visibility, but often limited by available switch data plane resources (e.g., cpu,
memory). So, they incorporate increasingly complex in-network techniques which
require more network bandwidth resources or make it hard to debug the network prob-
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lems. On the contrary, end-host based monitoring loses the benefits offered by in-
network monitoring approaches. Existing work on network verification focused on
detecting the inconsistency between intent and actual network behavior. In contrast,
this thesis focuses on localizing and finding the cause that creates the inconsistency.
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A particularly interesting problem in SDN debugging is to be able to reason about
flow of traffic (e.g., tracing individual packet trajectories) through the network [47,
59, 60, 66, 73, 110]. Such a functionality enables measuring network traffic matrix,
detecting traffic anomalies caused by congestion [36], localizing network failures [59,
60, 66], or simply ensuring that forwarding behavior at the data plane matches the
policies at the control plane [47]. Note that existing tools for tracing packet trajectories
can use one of the two broad approaches. On the one hand, tools like NetSight [47]
support a wide range of queries using after-the-fact analysis, but also incur large “out-
of-band” data collection overhead. In contrast, “in-band” tools (e.g., PathQuery [73]
and PathletTracer [110]) significantly reduce data collection overhead at the cost of
supporting a narrower range of queries.
We present CherryPick, a scalable, yet simple “in-band” technique for tracing packet
trajectories in SDN-enabled datacenter networks. CherryPick is designed with the
goal of minimizing two data plane resources: the number of switch flow rules and
the packet header space. Indeed, existing approaches to tracing packet trajectories in
SDN trade off one of these resources to minimize the other. At one end of the spec-
trum is the most naïve approach of assigning each network link a unique identifier and
switches embedding the identifier into the packet header during the forwarding pro-
23
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CherryPick PathletTracer Naïve
Path length 4 6 8 4 6 8 4 6 8
#Flow rules 48 48 48 576 1.2M 1.7B 48 48 48
#Header bits 11 22 33 10 21 31 24 36 48
Table 4.1: CherryPick achieves the best of the two existing techniques for trac-
ing packet trajectories — the minimal number of switch flow rules required
by the naïve approach and close to the minimal packet header space required
by PathletTracer [110]. These results are for a 48-ary fat-tree topology; M and
B stand for million and billion respectively. See §4.3 for details.
cess. This minimizes the number of switch flow rules required, but has high packet
header space overhead especially when the packets traverse along non-shortest paths
(e.g., due to failures along the shortest path). At the other end are techniques like
PathletTracer [110] that aim to minimize the packet header space, but end up requiring
a large number of switch flow rules (§4.3); PathQuery [73] acknowledges a similar
limitation in terms of switch resources.
CherryPick minimizes the number of switch flow rules required to trace packet tra-
jectories by building upon the naïve approach — each network link is assigned a unique
identifier and switches simply embed the identifier into the packet header during the
forwarding process. However, in contrast to the naïve approach, CherryPick minimizes
the packet header space by selectively picking a minimum number of essential links to
represent an end-to-end path. By exploiting the fact that datacenter network topologies
are often well-structured, CherryPick requires packet header space comparable to state-
of-the-art solutions [110], while retaining the minimal switch flow rule requirement of
the naïve approach. For instance, Table 4.1 compares the number of switch flow rules
and the packet header space required by CherryPick against the above two approaches
for a 48-ary fat-tree topology.
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Figure 4.1: A 4-ary fat-tree topology.
In summary, this chapter makes three contributions:
• We design CherryPick, a simple and scalable packet trajectory tracing technique
for SDN-enabled datacenter networks. The main idea in CherryPick is to exploit
the structure in datacenter network topologies to minimize number of switch
flow rules and packet header space required to trace packet trajectories. We apply
CherryPick to a fat-tree topology in this chapter to demonstrate the benefits of the
technique (§4.2).
• We show that CherryPick can trace all 4- and 6-hop paths in an up-to 72-ary
fat-tree with no hardware modification by using IEEE 802.1ad double-tagging
(§4.2).
• We evaluate CherryPick over a 48-ary fat-tree topology. Our results show that
CherryPick requires minimal number of switch flow rules while using packet
header space close to state-of-the-art techniques (§4.3).
4.2 CherryPick
This section describes the CherryPick design in detail with a focus on enabling L2/L3
packet trajectory tracing in a fat-tree network topology.
4.2.1 Preliminaries
The fat-tree topology. A k-ary fat-tree topology contains three layers of k-port switches:
Top-of-Rack (ToR), aggregate (Agg) and core. A 4-ary fat-tree topology is presented
in Figure 4.1 (ToR switches are nodes with letter T , Agg with letter A and core with let-
ter C). The topology consists of k pods, each of which has a layer of k/2 ToR switches
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and a layer of k/2 Agg switches. k/2 ports of each ToR switch are directly connected
to servers and each of remaining k/2 ports connected to k/2 Agg switches. The re-
maining k/2 ports of each Agg switch are connected to k/2 core switches. There are
a total of k2/4 core switches where port i on each core switch is connected to pod i.
To ease the following discussion, links present in the topology are grouped into two
categories: i) intra-pod link and ii) pod-core link. An intra-pod link is one connecting
a ToR and an Agg switch, whereas a pod-core link is one connecting an Agg and a
core switch. Note that there are k2/4 intra-pod links within a pod and a total of k3/4
pod-core links. In addition, affinity core segment, or affinity segment, is a group of
core switches that can be directly reached by each Agg switch at a particular position
in each pod. In Figure 4.1, C1 and C2 in affinity segment 1 are directly reached by
Agg switches at the lefthand side in each pod (i.e., A1, A3, A5, and A7).
Routing along non-shortest paths. While datacenter networks typically use short-
est path routing, packets can traverse along non-shortest paths due to several rea-
sons. First, node and/or link failures can enforce routing of packets along non-shortest
paths [30, 76, 104]. Consider, for instance, the topology in Figure 4.1 where a packet is
being routed between Src and Dst along the shortest path Src→ T1→A1→ C1→A3
→ T3→ Dst. If link C1→ A3 fails upon the packet arrival, the packet will be forced
to traverse a non-shortest path. Second, recently proposed techniques reroute pack-
ets along alternate (potentially non-shortest) paths [83, 100, 108] to avoid congested
links. Finally, misconfiguration may also create similar situations. The term “detour”
is defined to collectively refer to situations that force packets to traverse along a non-
shortest path. The ability to be able to trace packet trajectories in case of packet detours
is, thus, important since this may reveal network failures and/or misconfiguration is-
sues.
However, packet detours complicate trajectory tracing due to the vastly increased
number of possible paths even in a medium-size datacenter. For instance, given a 48-
ary fat-tree topology, the number of shortest paths (i.e., 4-hop paths) between a host
pair in different pods is just 576. On the other hand, there exist almost 1.31 million
6-hop paths for the same host pair. As shown in §4.3, techniques that work well for
tracing shortest paths [110] do not necessarily scale to the case of packet detours.
Detour model. CherryPick is designed to work with arbitrary routing schemes. How-
ever, to ease the discussion, this work focused on a simplified detour model where
once the packet is forwarded by the Agg switch in the source pod, it does not traverse
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any ToR switch other than the ones in the destination pod. For instance, in Figure 4.1,
consider a packet traversing from Src in Pod 1 to Dst in Pod 2. Under this simplifica-
tion, the packet visits none of ToR switches T5, T6, T7 and T8 once it leaves T1. Of
course, in practice, packets may visit ToR switches in non-destination pods. In such a
case, packet following a path longer than 6 hops, which is not common, is forwarded
to controller. Then, controller verify routing policies, and take the necessary actions
(e.g. re-injects the packet into network, raises the alarm).
4.2.2 Overview of CherryPick
This section gives a high-level description of CherryPick design. Consider the naïve
approach that embeds in the packet header an identifier (ID) for each link that the
packet traverses. For a 48-port switch, it is easy to see that this approach requires
dlog(48)e= 6 bits to represent each link. Indeed, the header space requirement for
this naïve approach is far higher than the theoretical bound, log(P) bits, where P is
the number of paths between any source-destination pair. For tracing 4-hop paths, the
naïve scheme requires 24 bits whereas only 10 bits are theoretically required since P
is 576 (P = k2/4).
CherryPick builds upon the observation that data center network topologies are of-
ten well-structured and allow reconstructing the end-to-end path without actually stor-
ing each link as the packet traverses. CherryPick, thus, cherry-picks a minimum number
of links essential to represent an end-to-end path. For instance, for the fat-tree topol-
ogy, it suffices to store the ID of the pod-core link to reconstruct any 4-hop path. To
handle a longer path, in addition to picking a pod-core link, CherryPick selects one
extra link every additional 2 hops. Hence, tracing any n-hop path (n ≥ 4) requires
only (n−4)/2+1 links worth of header space1. However, the cherry-picking of links
makes it impossible to use local port IDs as link identifiers and using global link IDs
requires a large number of bits per ID due to the sheer number of links in the topology.
CherryPick, thus, assigns link IDs in a manner that each link ID requires fewer bits
than a global ID and that the end-to-end path between any source-destination pair can
be reconstructed without any ambiguity. Section 4.2.3, discuss how CherryPick recon-
structs end-to-end paths using cherry-picking the links along with a careful assignment
of non-global link IDs.
CherryPick leverages VLAN tagging to embed chosen links in the packet header.
1A 2-hop path is the shortest path between servers in the same pod, for which CherryPick simply
picks one intra-pod link at Agg.
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Port IP Src IP Dst Action
3 10.pod.0.0/16 10.pod.0.0/16 write_metadata: 0x0/0x0
4 10.pod.0.0/16 10.pod.0.0/16 write_metadata: 0x0/0x0
3 10.pod.0.0/16 * push_vlan_id: linkID(3)
4 10.pod.0.0/16 * push_vlan_id: linkID(4)
(a) ToR switch
Port IP Src IP Dst Action
1 * 10.pod.0.0/16 push_vlan_id: linkID(1)
2 * 10.pod.0.0/16 push_vlan_id: linkID(2)
(b) Aggregate switch
Port IP Src IP Dst Action
1 * * push_vlan_id: linkID(1)
2 * * push_vlan_id: linkID(2)
3 * * push_vlan_id: linkID(3)
4 * * push_vlan_id: linkID(4)
(c) Core switch
Figure 4.2: OpenFlow table entries at each switch layer for the 4-ary fat-tree.
In this example, the address follows the form of 10.pod.switch.host, where pod
denotes pod number (where switch is), switch denotes position of switch in
the pod, host denotes the sequential ID of each host. These entries are stored
in a separate table which will be placed at the beginning of a table pipeline.
In (a), 3 and 4 are port numbers connected to Agg layer. In (b), 1 and 2 are
port numbers connected to ToR layer.
While the OpenFlow standard [79] does not dictate how many VLAN tags can be in-
serted in the header, typically commodity SDN switches only support IEEE 802.1ad
double-tagging. With two tags, CherryPick can keep track of all 1.31 million 6-hop
paths in the 48-ary fat-tree while keeping switch flow memory overhead low. As hard-
ware programmability in SDN switch increases [25, 51], we expect that the issue raised
by the limited number of tags can be mitigated.
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4.2.3 Design
This section discuss CherryPick design in depth. The focus is on three aspects of the
design: (1) selectively picking links that allow reconstructing the end-to-end path and
configuring switch rules to enable link picking; (2) careful assignment of link IDs to
further minimize the packet header space; and (3) the path reconstruction process using
the link IDs embedded in the packet header.
Picking links. Consider a packet arriving at an input port. The link attached to the
input port is called as ingress link. For each packet, every switch has a simple link
selection mechanism that can be easily converted into OpenFlow rules. If the packet
matches one of the rules, the ingress link is picked; and its ID is embedded into the
packet using VLAN tag.
The following describes the link selection mechanism at each switch level, and
Figure 4.2 shows flow rules derived from the mechanisms:
• ToR: If a ToR switch receives the packet from an Agg switch and if the packet’s
source belongs to the same pod, the switch picks the ingress link connected to the
Agg switch that forwarded the packet. However, if both source and destination are
in the same pod, the switch ignores the ingress link (we use write_metadata
command to implement the “do nothing” operation). For all other cases, no link is
picked.
• Aggregate: If an Agg switch receives the packet from a ToR switch and if the
packet’s destination is in the same pod, the ingress link is chosen. Otherwise, no
link is picked.
• Core: Core switch always picks the ingress link.
Using the above set of rules, CherryPick selects the minimum number of links re-
quired to reconstruct the end-to-end path of any packet. For ease of exposition, four
examples are present in Figure 4.3. First, Figure 4.3(a) illustrates the baseline 4-hop
scenario. In this scenario, core switch C2 only picks an ingress link and other switches
(e.g., A1, A3 and T3) do nothing. In case of one detour at source pod (Figure 4.3(b)),
T2 and C2 will choose each ingress link of a packet while others not. A similar
picking process is undertaken in case of one detour at destination pod (Figure 4.3(c)).
When one detour occurs between aggregate and core switch (Figure 4.3(d)), only core
switches which see the detoured packet pick the ingress links.
Link ID assignment. CherryPick assigns IDs for intra-pod links and pod-core links
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Figure 4.3: An illustration of link cherry-picking in CherryPick. (x , y) means
x number of hops and detour at location y.
separately.
i) Intra-pod links: Since pods are separated by core switches, the same set of links
IDs is used across all pods. Since each pod has (k/2)2 intra-pod links, we need (k/2)2
IDs. Links at the same position across pods have the same link ID.
ii) Pod-core links: Assigning IDs to pod-core links such that the correct end-to-end
path can be reconstructed while minimizing the number of bits required to represent
the ID is non-trivial. Indeed, one way to assign IDs is to consider all pod-core links,
and assign each link a unique ID. However, there are k3/4 pod-core links and such
an approach would require dlog(k3/4)e many bits per link ID. It can be significantly
reduced by viewing the problem as an edge coloring problem of a complete bipartite
graph. In this problem, the goal is to assign colors to the edges of the graph such that
adjacent edges of a vertex have different colors. Edge-coloring a complete bipartite
graph requires α different colors where α is the graph’s maximum degree.
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(a) 4-ary fat-tree









(b) A bipartite graph





(c) Uniquely colored links (d) Edge-colored fat-tree
Figure 4.4: Edge-coloring pod-core links in a 4-ary fat-tree.
To view a fat-tree as a complete bipartite graph with two disjoint sets, a pod is
treated as a vertex in the first set and an affinity core segment as a vertex in the second
set (compare Figures 4.4(a) and 4.4(b)). Then, edges (links) from an Agg switch are
grouped to an affinity core segment and supersede them by one edge named as cluster
edge (Figure 4.4(b)). Since the maximum degree is k (i.e., the number of cluster edges
at an affinity core segment), we need k different colors to edge-color this bipartite
graph. Note that one cluster edge is a collection of all k/2 links. Therefore, we need k
different color sets such that each color set has k/2 different colors and any two color
sets are disjoint (Figure 4.4(c)). Thus in total k(k/2) different colors are required.
The actual color assignment is done by applying a near-linear time algorithm [31].
Figure 4.4(d) shows an accurate color allocation.
Putting it together, the number of unique IDs required is 3k2/4 ((k/2)2 for the
intra-pod links and k(k/2) for the pod-core links). Thus, CherryPick requires a total
of dlog(3k2/4)e bits to represent each link. For 48-ary and 72-ary fat-tree, CherryPick
requires just 11 and 12 bits respectively to represent each link. CherryPick can thus
support an up-to 72-ary fat-tree topology using the 12 bits available in VLAN tag.
Path reconstruction. With this scheme, when a packet reaches its destination, it con-
tains a minimum set of link IDs necessary to reconstruct a complete path. To keep it
simple, suppose that those link IDs in the header are extracted and stored in the order
that they were selected. At the destination, a network topology graph is given and each
link in the graph is annotated with one ID. Path reconstruction process begins from
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source ToR switch in the graph. Initially, a list S contains the source ToR switch. Until
all the link IDs are consumed, the following steps are executed: i) take one link ID
(say, l) from the ID list and find, from the topology graph, a link whose ID is l (if l is
in the pod ID space, search for the link in either source or destination pod depending
on whether pod-core link is consumed; otherwise, search for it in the current affinity
segment); ii) identify two switches (say, sa and sb) that form the link; iii) out of the
two, choose one (say, sa) closer to the switch (say, sr) that was most recently added
to S; iv) find a shortest path (which is simple because it is either 1-hop or 2-hop path)
between sa and sr and add all intermediate nodes (those closer to sr first) and sa later
to S; v) add the remaining switch sb to S. After all link IDs are consumed, we add
to S the switches that form a shortest path from the switch included last in S to the
destination ToR switch. Finally, we obtain a complete path by enumerating switches
in S.
4.3 Evaluation
This section presents preliminary evaluation results for CherryPick, and compare it
against PathletTracer [110] over a 48-ary fat-tree topology. The two schemes are eval-
uated in terms of number of switch flow rules (§4.3.1), packet header space (§4.3.2)
and end-host resources (§4.3.3) required for tracing packet trajectories. While prelim-
inary, evaluation suggests that:
• CherryPick requires minimal number of switch flow rules to trace packet trajec-
tories. In particular, CherryPick requires as many rules as the number of ports per
switch. In contrast, PathletTracer requires number of switch flow rules linear in
the number of paths that the switch belongs to. For tracing 6-hop paths in a 48-
ary fat-tree topology, for instance, CherryPick requires three orders of magnitude
fewer switch rules than PathletTracer while supporting similar functionality.
• CherryPick requires packet header space close to state-of-the-art techniques. Com-
pared to PathletTracer, CherryPick trades off slightly higher packet header space
requirements for significantly improved scalability in terms of number of switch
flow rules required to trace packet trajectories.
• CherryPick requires minimal resources at the end hosts for tracing packet trajec-
tories. In particular, CherryPick requires as much as three orders of magnitude
fewer entries at the destination when compared to PathletTracer for tracing 6-hop
paths on a 48-ary fat-tree topology.











































Figure 4.5: CherryPick requires number of switch flow rules comparable to
PathletTracer for tracing shortest paths. However, for tracing non-shortest
paths (e.g., packets may traverse such paths in case of failures), the number
of switch flow rules required by PathletTracer increases super-linearly. In con-
trast, the number of switch flow rules required by CherryPick remains constant.
4.3.1 Switch flow rules
CherryPick, for any given switch, requires as many flow rules as the number of ports
at that switch. In contrast, for any given switch, PathletTracer requires as many switch
flow rules as the number of paths that contain that switch. Since the latter depends
on the layer at which the switch resides, number of switch flow rules are plotted for
CherryPick and PathletTracer across each layer separately (see Figure 4.5).
It is observed that for tracing shortest paths only, the number of switch flow rules
required by PathletTracer is comparable to those required by CherryPick. However, if
one desires to trace non-shortest paths (e.g., in case of failures), the number of switch
flow requirement of PathletTracer grows super-linearly with the number of hops con-
stituting the paths2. For tracing 6-hop paths, for instance, PathletTracer requires over
a million rules on ToR switch, tens of thousands of rules on Aggregate switch, and
2The number of switch flow rules required by PathletTracer could be reduced by tracing “pathlets”
(a sub-path of an end-to-end path) at the cost of coarser tracing compared to CherryPick.

























Figure 4.6: CherryPick requires packet header space comparable to Pathlet-
Tracer for tracing packet trajectories. In particular, for tracing 6-hop paths
in a 48-ary fat-tree topology, CherryPick requires 22 bits while PathletTracer
requires 21 bits worth of header space.
thousands of rules on Core switch. This means that PathletTracer would not scale well
for path tracing at L3 layer because packets may follow non-shortest paths. In contrast,
CherryPick requires a small number of switch flow rules independent of path length.
4.3.2 Packet header space
We now evaluate the number of bits in the packet header required to trace packet tra-
jectories (see Figure 4.6). Recall from §4.2 that to enable tracing of any n-hop path
in a fat-tree topology, CherryPick requires embedding (n−4)/2+1 links in the packet
header. The number of bits required to uniquely represent each link increases logarith-
mically with number of ports per switch; for a 48-ary fat-tree topology, each link re-
quires 11 bits worth of space. PathletTracer requires log(P) bits worth of header space,
where P is the number of paths between the source and the destination. We observe
that CherryPick requires slightly higher packet header space than PathletTracer (espe-
cially for longer paths); however, as discussed earlier, CherryPick trades off slightly
higher header space requirement with significantly improved scalability in terms of
switch flow rules.
4.3.3 End host resources
Finally, performance of CherryPick is compared against PathletTracer in terms of the
resource requirements at the end host. Each of the two schemes stores certain entries
at the end host to trace the packet trajectory using the information carried in the packet
header. Processing the packet header requires relatively simple lookups into the stored
entries for both schemes, which is a lightweight operation. We hence only quantify the



























Figure 4.7: CherryPick requires significantly fewer entries than PathletTracer
at each end host compared to trace packet trajectories. In particular, for trac-
ing 6-hop paths in a 48-ary fat-tree topology, CherryPick requires less than
1MB worth of entries while PathletTracer requires approximately 12GB worth
of entries at each end host.
number of entries required for both schemes.
CherryPick stores, at each destination, the entire set of network links, each anno-
tated with a unique identifier. PathletTracer requires storing a “codebook”, where each
entry is a code assigned to each of the unique path. For fair comparison, we assume
that individual hosts in PathletTracer store an equal-sized subset of the codebook that
is only relevant to them.
Figure 4.7 shows that PathletTracer needs to store non-trivial number of entries if
non-shortest paths need to be traced. For instance, PathletTracer requires more than
109 entries at each end host to trace 6-hop paths, which translates to approximately
12GB worth of entries as each entry is about 12 bytes long. As discussed earlier, this
overhead for PathletTracer could be reduced at the cost of tracing at coarser granulari-
ties. In contrast, since CherryPick stores only the set of links constituting the network,
it requires a small, fixed number of entries (∼56K entries per host for a 48-ary fat-tree
topology).
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4.4 Summary
This chapter presents CherryPick, a simple yet scalable technique for tracing packet
trajectories in SDN-enabled datacenter networks. The core idea in CherryPick is that
structure in datacenter network topologies enable reconstructing end-to-end paths us-
ing a few essential links. To that end, CherryPick “cherry-picks” a subset of links along
the packet trajectory and embeds them into the packet header. CherryPick is applied
to a fat-tree topology in this chapter and showed that it requires minimal switch flow
rules to enable tracing packet trajectories, while requiring packet header space close to
state-of-the-art techniques.
Chapter 5
Simplifying Data center Network
Debugging with PathDump
5.1 Introduction
Data center networks are complex. Networks are built based on scale-out topologies,
that consists of tens of thousands of network devices, and aggregate traffic can easily
exceed 100 Tbps [112]. Such a large-scale network also involves complex dependen-
cies [112, 44] among these many network components. Despite this complexity, users
continue to demand very high performance for their applications. Performance degra-
dation of these services, even for short period of time, can cause millions of dollars
revenue loss. For instance, Amazon reports [1] that every 100 ms delay costs 1% of
its e-commerce revenue. The network becomes even more complex, with enforcement
of policies like security and isolation. Increasingly, many data centers are using pro-
grammable hardware [10]. In these data centers, network switches can be dynamically
programmed to achieve various goals. This programmability adds to the complexity of
networks.
In such a large, complex and dynamic environment, network problems in the data
plane are inevitable. For example, failures or bugs can trigger forwarding rule updates
and temporarily create loops in the network. A faulty interface drops packets at random
and does not update respective counters, thus creating a silent random packet drop
problem [112]. In the presence of such data plane problems, what is happening in the
network may not match with the network operator’s intention, which could result in
performance degradation [109, 112] or even network outages [59]. Ideally, the operator
wants to debug and fix such network problems in real time using debugging tools. To
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this end, there have been lots of recent efforts in building debugging tools [36, 107, 96,
112, 75, 66, 60, 47, 63].
Network debuggers are even more complex. Over the years, the class of network
problems supported by existing network debugging tools has grown significantly. Ac-
cordingly, the tools have incorporated increasingly complex techniques — collecting
data plane snapshots [66, 60, 59, 58, 40], collecting per-packet per-switch packet
logs [112, 77, 47, 86, 107, 96, 36, 13], selective mirroring of packets [112], packet
sampling [107, 96, 36, 13], using active probe packets [16, 109, 112], replaying traf-
fic [103], dynamic rule installation [75, 46] — and this list barely scratches the surface
of all the sophisticated techniques used in existing network debugging tools.
Our goal is not add to the impressive collection of network debugging techniques.
Instead, we ask whether there are a non-trivial number of network debugging problems
that could obviate the need for sophisticated in-network techniques. Thus, our focus is
not to try to beat existing tools in either generality or in performance, but to help them
focus on a smaller subset of nails (debugging problems) that we need a hammer (de-
bugging techniques) for. The hope is that by focusing on a smaller subset of problems,
the already complex networks1 and the debugging tools for these networks can be kept
as simple as possible.
PathDump design. We present PathDump, an end-host based network debugger that
demonstrates our approach by enabling a large class of debugging problems with min-
imal in-network functionality. PathDump design is based on tracing packet trajectories
and comprises of the following:
• Switches are simple; they neither require dynamic rule updates nor perform any
packet sampling or mirroring. In addition to its usual operations, a switch checks
for a condition before forwarding a packet; if the condition is met, the switch
embeds its identifier into the packet header (e.g., with VLAN tags).
• An edge device, upon receiving a packet, records the list of switch identifiers
in the packet header on a local storage and query engine; a number of entries
stored in the engine (used for debugging purposes) are also updated based on
these switch identifiers.
• Entries at each edge device can be used to trigger and debug anomalous network
behavior; a query server can also slice-and-dice entries across multiple edge
1as eloquently argued in [112]; in fact, our question about simpler networks and debugging tools
was initially motivated by the arguments about network complexity in [112].
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devices in a distributed manner (e.g., for debugging functionalities that require
correlating entries across flows).
PathDump’s design, by requiring minimal in-network functionality, presents several
benefits as well as raises a number of interesting challenges. The benefits are rather
straightforward. PathDump not only requires minimal functionality to be implemented
at switches, but also uses minimal switch resources; thus, the limited switch resources [33,
70] can be utilized for exactly those tasks that necessitate an in-network implementa-
tion2. PathDump also preserves flow-level locality — information about all packets
in the same flow is recorded and analyzed on the same end-host. Since PathDump
requires little or no data transfer in addition to network traffic, it also alleviates the
bandwidth overheads of several existing in-network debuggers [47, 86, 112].
PathDump challenges. PathDump resolves several challenges to achieve the above
benefits. First challenge is regarding generality — what class of network problems
can PathDump debug with minimal support from network switches? To get a rela-
tively concrete answer in light of numerous possible network debugging problems, we
examined all the problems discussed in several recent works [47, 51, 75, 112] (see
Table 5.2). Interestingly, we find that PathDump can already support more than 85%
of these problems. For some problems, network support seems necessary; however, we
show that PathDump can help “pinpoint” these problems to a small part of the network.
We discuss the design, implementation and evaluation of PathDump for the supported
functionality in §5.2.3 and §5.4.
PathDump also resolves the challenge of packets not reaching the edge devices
(e.g., due to packet drops or routing loops). A priori, it may seem obvious that PathDump
must not be able to debug such problems without significant support from network
switches. PathDump resolves the packet drop problem by exploiting the fact that data-
centers typically perform load balancing (using ECMP or packet spraying [35]); specif-
ically, we show that the difference between number of packets traversing along multi-
ple paths allows identifying spurious packet drops. PathDump can in fact debug routing
loops by leveraging the fact that commodity SDN switches recognize only two VLAN
2As PathDump matures, we envision it to incorporate (potentially simpler than existing) in-
network techniques for debugging problems that necessitate an in-network implementation. As
network switches evolve to provide more powerful functionalities (e.g., on-chip sampling) and/or
larger resource pools, partitioning the debugging functionality between the edge devices and the
network elements will still be useful to enable capturing network problems at per-packet granularity
— a goal that is desirable and yet, infeasible to achieve using today’s resources. Existing in-network
tools that claim to achieve per-packet granularity (e.g., Everflow [112]) have to resort to sampling
to overcome scalability issues and thus, fail to achieve per-packet granularity.
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tags in hardware and processing more than two tags involves switch CPU (§5.4.5).
Finally, PathDump carefully optimizes the use of data plane resources (e.g., switch
rules and packet header space) and end-host resources (e.g., CPU and memory). PathDump
extends our prior work, CherryPick (Chapter 4), for per-packet trajectory tracing us-
ing minimal data plane resources. For end-host resources, we evaluate PathDump over
a wide range of network debugging problems across a variety of network testbeds
comprising of commodity network switches and end-hosts; our evaluation shows that
PathDump requires minimal CPU and memory at end-hosts while enabling network
debugging over fine-grained time scales.
PathDump contributions. Overall, PathDump makes three main contributions:
• Make a case for partitioning the network debugging functionality between the
edge devices and the network elements, with the goal of keeping network switches
free from complex operations like per-packet log generation, dynamic rule up-
dates, packet sampling, packet mirroring, etc.
• Design and implementation of PathDump3, a network debugger that demon-
strates that it is possible to support a large class of network management and
debugging problems with minimal support from network switches.
• Evaluation of PathDump over operational network testbeds comprising of com-
modity network hardware demonstrating that PathDump can debug network events
at fine-grained time-scales with minimal data plane and end-host resources.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 gives overview of PathDump, Sec-
tion 5.3 has details of PathDump’s implementation, Section 5.4 discusses various de-
bugging applications enabled using PathDump, and Section 5.5 presents the PathDump
system’s evaluation.
5.2 Overview
We start with an overview of the PathDump interface (§5.2.1) and PathDump design
(§5.2.2). We then provide several examples of using the PathDump interface for de-
bugging network problems (§5.2.3, §5.2.4).
3Available at: https://github.com/PathDump.
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Host API Description
getFlows(linkID, timeRange) Return list of flows that traverse linkID
during specified timeRange.
getPaths(flowID, linkID, timeRange)Return list of Paths that include linkID,
and are traversed by flowID during speci-
fied timeRange.
getCount(Flow, timeRange) Return packet and byte counts of a flow
within a specified timeRange.
getDuration(Flow, timeRange) Return the duration of aflowwithin a spec-
ified timeRange.
getPoorTCPFlows(Threshold) Return the flowIDs for which
protocol = TCP and the number
of consecutive packet retransmissions
exceeds a threshold.
Alarm(flowID, Reason, Paths) Raise an alarm regarding flowID with a
reason code (e.g., TCP performance alert
(POOR_PERF)), and corresponding list of
Paths.
Controller API Description
execute(List〈HostID〉,Query) Execute aQuery once at each host specified
in list of HostIDs; a Query could be any
of the ones from Host API.
install(List〈HostID〉,Query,Period) Install a Query at each host specified in
list of HostIDs to be executed at regular
Periods. If the Period is not set, the
query execution is triggered by a new event
(e.g., receiving a packet).
uninstall(List〈HostID〉,Query) Uninstall a Query from each host specified
in list of HostIDs
Table 5.1: PathDump Interface. See §5.2.1 for definitions and discussion.
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5.2.1 Interface
PathDump exposes a simple interface for network debugging; see Table 5.1. We as-
sume that each switch and host has a unique ID. We use the following definitions:
• A linkID is a pair of adjacent switchIDs (〈Si,Sj〉);
• A Path is a list of switchIDs (〈Si,Sj, . . .〉);
• A flowID is the usual 5-tuple (〈srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, protocol〉);
• A Flow is a (〈flowID, Path〉) pair; this will be useful for cases when packets
from the same flowID may traverse along multiple Paths.
• A timeRange is a pair of timestamps (〈ti,tj〉);
PathDump supports wildcard entries for switchIDs and timestamps. For
instance, (〈?,Sj〉) is interpreted as all incoming links for switch Sj and (〈ti,?〉) is inter-
preted as “since time ti”.
Note that each host exposes the host API in Table 5.1 and returns results for “local”
flows, that is, for flows that have this host as their dstIP. To collect the results dis-
tributed across PathDump instances at individual end-hosts, the controller may use the
controller API — to execute a query, to install a query for periodic execution,
or to uninstall a query.
5.2.2 Design Overview
The central idea in PathDump is to trace packet trajectories. To achieve this, each
switch embeds its switchID in the packet header before forwarding the packet. How-
ever, naïvely embedding all the switchIDs along the packet trajectory requires large
packet header space, especially when packets may traverse a non-shortest path (e.g.,
due to failures along the shortest path) [98]. PathDump uses the link sampling idea
from CherryPick (see §4.2) to trace packet trajectories using commodity switches.
However, CherryPick supports commonly used datacenter network topologies (e.g.,
FatTree, VL2, etc.) and does not work with arbitrary topologies. Note that this limi-
tation on supported network topologies is merely an artifact of today’s hardware — as
networks evolve to support larger packet header space, PathDump will support more
general topologies without any modification in its design and implementation.
An edge device, upon receiving a packet, extracts the list of switchIDs in the packet
header and records them on a local storage and query engine (along with associated
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metadata, e.g., flowID, timestamps, number of packets, number of bytes, etc.). Each
edge device stores:
• A list of flow-level entries that are used for debugging purposes; these entries
are updated upon each event (e.g., receiving a packet).
• A static view of the datacenter network topology, including the statically as-
signed identifiers for each switch. This view provides PathDump with the “ground
truth” about the network topology and packet paths.
• And, optionally, network configuration files specifying forwarding policies. These
files are also used for monitoring and debugging purposes (e.g., ensuring packet
trajectories conform to specified forwarding policies). The operator may also
push these configuration files to the end-hosts dynamically using the Query
installation in controller API.
Finally, each edge device exposes the API in Table 5.1 for identifying, triggering and
debugging anomalous network behavior. The entries stored in PathDump (within an
edge device or across multiple edge devices) can be sliced-and-diced for implement-
ing powerful debugging functionalities (e.g., correlating entries across flows going to
different edge devices). PathDump currently disregards packet headers after updating
the entries to avoid latency and throughput bottlenecks in writing to persistent storage;
extending PathDump to store and query at per-packet granularity remains an intriguing
future direction.
5.2.3 Example applications
We now discuss several examples for network debugging applications using PathDump
API.
Path conformance. Suppose the operator wants to check for policy violations on
certain properties of the path taken by a particular flowID (e.g., path length no more
than 6, or packets must avoid switchID). Then, the controller may install the
following query at the end-hosts:
Paths = getPaths(flowID, <*, *>, *)
for path in Paths:
if len(path)>=6 or switchID in path:
result.append (path)
if len(result) > 0:
Alarm (flowID, PC_FAIL, result)
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PathDump executes the query either upon each packet arrival, or periodically when
a Period is specified in the query; an Alarm() is triggered upon each violation.
Load imbalance. Understanding why load balancing works poorly (as explained in
Section 2.2) is of interest to operators because uneven traffic splits may cause severe
congestion, thereby hurting throughput and latency performance. PathDump helps di-
agnose load imbalance problems, independent of the underlying scheme used for load
balancing (e.g., ECMP or packet spraying). The following example constructs flow
size distribution for each of two egress ports (i.e., links) of interest on a particular
switch:
result = {}; binsize = 10000
linkIDs = (l1, l2); tRange = (t1, t2)
for lID in linkIDs:
flows = getFlows (lID, tRange)
for flow in flows:
(bytes, pkts) = getCount (flow, tRange)
result[lID][bytes/binsize] += 1
return result
Through cross-comparison of the flow size distributions on the two egress ports,
the operator can tell the degree of load imbalance. Even finer-grained diagnosis on
load balancing is feasible; e.g., when packet spraying is used, PathDump can identify
whether or not the traffic of a flow in question is equally spread along various end-to-
end paths. We demonstrate these use cases in §5.4.2.
Silent random packet drops. This network problem occurs when some faulty inter-
face at switch drops packets at random (§2.2) without updating the discarded packet
counters at respective interfaces. It is a critical network problem [112] and is often
very challenging to localize.
PathDump allows a network operator to implement a localization algorithm such
as MAX-COVERAGE [61]. The algorithm, as input, requires logs or observations on
a network problem (that is, failure signatures). Using PathDump, a network operator
can install a TCP performance monitoring query at the end-hosts for periodic
monitoring (e.g., period set to be 200 ms):
flowIDs = getPoorTCPFlows()
for flowID in flowIDs:
Alarm (flowID, POOR_PERF, [])
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Every time an alarm is triggered, the controller sends the respective end-host (by pars-
ing flowID) the following query and collects failure signatures (that is, path(s) taken
by the flow that suffers serious retransmissions):
flowID = (sIP, sPort, dIP, dPort, 6)
linkID = (*, *); tRange = (t1, *)
paths = getPaths (flowID, linkID, tRange)
return paths
The controller receives the query results (that is, paths that potentially include faulty
links), locally stores them, and runs the MAX-COVERAGE algorithm implemented
as only about 50 lines of Python code. This procedure repeats whenever a new alert
comes up. As more path data of suffering TCP flows get accumulated, the algorithm
localizes faulty links more accurately.
Traffic measurement. PathDump also allows to write queries for various measure-
ments such as traffic matrix, heavy hitters, top-k flows, and so forth. The following
query computes top-1000 flows at a given end-host:
h = []; linkID = (*, *); tRange = (t1, t2)
flows = getFlows (linkID, tRange)
for flow in flows:
(bytes, pkts) = getCount (flow, tRange)
if len(h) < 1000 or bytes > h[0][0]:
if len(h) == 1000: heapq.heappop (h)
heapq.heappush (h, (bytes, flow))
return h
To obtain top-k flows from multiple end-hosts, the controller can execute this query
at the desired subset of the end-hosts.
5.2.4 Reducing debugging space
As discussed in §5.1, some network debugging problems necessitate an in-network
implementation. One such problem is network switches incorrectly modifying the
packet header — for some corner case scenarios, it seems hard for any end-host based
system to be able to debug such problems.
One precise example in case of PathDump is switches inserting incorrect switchIDs
in the packet header. In case of such network anomalies, PathDump may not be
able to identify the problem. For instance, consider the path conformance appli-
cation from §5.2.3 and suppose we want to ensure that packets do not traverse a
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Figure 5.1: PathDump system overview
switch s1 (that is, switchID=s1 in the example). Suppose the packet trajectory
{src,s1,s2,...,dst} actually involves s1 and hence, PathDump must raise an
alarm.
The main problem is that if s1 inserts a wrong switchID, say s′1, then PathDump
will not raise an alarm. However, in many cases, the trajectory {src,s′1,s2,...,dst}
in itself will be infeasible — either because s′1 is not one of the switchIDs or be-
cause the switch with ID s′1 does not connect directly to either src or s2. In such
cases, PathDump will be able to trigger an alarm stating that one of the switches has
inserted incorrect switchID; this is because PathDump continually compares the ex-
tracted packet trajectory to the ground truth (network topology) stored in PathDump.
5.3 Implementation
PathDump implementation comprises of three main components (Figure 5.1):
• In-network implementation for tracing packet trajectories using packet headers
and static network switch rules (§5.3.1); PathDump’s current implementation
relies entirely on commodity OpenFlow features for packet trajectory tracing.
• A server stack that implements a storage and query engine for identifying, trig-
gering and debugging anomalous network behavior (§5.3.2); we use C/C++ and
Python for implementing the stack.
• A controller running network debugging applications in conjunction with the
server stack (§5.3.3). The current controller implementation uses Flask [4] — a
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micro framework supporting a RESTful web service — for exchange of query-
responses messages between the controller and the end-hosts.
We describe each of the individual components below. As mentioned earlier, PathDump
implementation is available at https://github.com/PathDump.
5.3.1 Tracing packet trajectory
PathDump traces packet trajectories at per-packet granularity by embedding into the
packet header the IDs of switches that a packet traverses. To achieve this, PathDump
resolves two related challenges.
First, the packet header space is a scarce resource. The naïve approach of having
each switch embed its switchID into the header before forwarding the packet would
require large packet header space, especially when packets can traverse non-shortest
paths (e.g., due to failures along the shortest path). For instance, tracing a 8-hop path on
a 48-ary FatTree topology would require 4 bytes worth of packet header space, which
is not supported using commodity network components4. PathDump traces packet
trajectories using close to optimal packet header space by using the link sampling idea
presented in our preliminary work, CherryPick §4.2. Intuitively, CherryPick builds
upon the observation that most frequently used datacenter network topologies are very
structured (e.g., FatTree, VL2) and this structure enables reconstructing an end-to-end
path by keeping track of a few carefully “sampled” links along any path. We provide
more details below.
The second challenge that PathDump resolves is implementation of packet trajec-
tory tracing using commodity off-the-shelf SDN switches. Specifically, PathDump
uses the VLAN and the MPLS tags in packet headers along with carefully constructed
network switch rules to trace packet trajectories. One key challenge in using VLAN
tags is that the ASIC of SDN switch (e.g., Pica8 P-3297) typically offers line rate pro-
cessing of a packet carrying up to two VLAN tags (i.e., QinQ). Hence, if a packet
somehow carries three or more tags in its header, a switch attempting to match TCP/IP
header fields of the packet would trigger a rule miss and usually forward it to the
controller. This can hurt the flow performance. We show that PathDump can enable
per-packet trajectory tracing for most frequently used datacenter network topologies
(e.g., FatTree and VL2), even for non-shortest paths (e.g., up to 2 hops in addition
4We believe networks will evolve to support larger packet header space. We discuss how
PathDump could exploit this to provide even stronger functionality. However, we do note that even
with availability to larger packet header space, ideas in PathDump may be useful since this additional
packet header space will be shared by multiple applications.
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to the shortest path), using just two VLAN tags. Note that these limitations on sup-
ported network topologies and path lengths are merely an artifact of today’s hardware
— PathDump achieves what is possible with today’s networks, and as networks evolve
to support larger packet header space, PathDump will support more general topologies
(e.g., Jupiter network [91]) and/or longer path lengths without any modification in its
design and implementation.
However, not all non-shortest paths need to be saved and examined at end-hosts.
In particular, when a path is suspiciously long, instant inspection at the controller is
desirable while packets are on the fly; it may indeed turn out to be a serious problem
such as routing loop. PathDump allows the network operator to define the number
of hops that would constitute a suspiciously long path (we use 4 hops in addition to
the shortest path length as default because packets rarely traverse such a long path in
datacenter networks).
For the ease of understanding, we briefly review the ideas from CherryPick below;
we refer the readers to §4.2 for more detailed discussion and evaluation. We then
close the subsection with a discussion on identifying and trapping packets traversing a
suspiciously long path.
Tracing technique. The need for techniques like CherryPick is clear; a naïve approach
of embedding link ID of each hop into the packet header simply does not work (more
details in §4.2). Assuming 48-port switches, embedding a 6-hop path requires 36 bits
in the header space whereas two VLAN tags only allow 24 bits.
The core idea of CherryPick is to sample links that suffice in representing an end-
to-end path. One key challenge is that sampling links makes a local identifier inappli-
cable. Instead, each link should be assigned a global identifier. Clearly, the number of
physical links is far more than that of available link IDs (c.f., 4,096 unique link IDs
expressed in a 12 bit VLAN identifier vs. 55,296 physical links in a 48-ary fat-tree
topology).
In addressing the issue, the following observation is used: aggregate switches be-
tween different lower level blocks (e.g., pods) must be interconnected only through
core switches. Therefore, instead of assigning global IDs for the links in each pod,
it becomes possible to share the same set of global IDs across pods. In addition,
the scheme efficiently assigns IDs to core links by applying an edge-coloring tech-
nique [31]. The following describes how the links should be picked for fat-tree and
VL2:
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• Fat-tree: A key observation in it is that given any 4-hop path, when a packet
reaches a core switch, the ToR-aggregate link it traversed becomes easily known, and
there is only a single route to destination from the core switch. Hence, to build the
end-to-end path, it is sufficient to pick one aggregate-core link that the packet traverses.
When the packet is diverted from its original shortest path, the technique selects one
extra link every additional 2 hops. Thus, two VLAN tags make it feasible to trace any
6-hop path. The mechanism is easily converted into OpenFlow rules (see §4.2). The
number of rules at switch grows linearly over switch port density.
• VL2: VL2 requires to sample three links for tracing any 6-hop path. Hence, we
additionally use DSCP field. However, because the field is only 6-bits long, we use it
in order to sample an ToR-aggregate link in pod where there are only k links. After
the DSCP field is spent, VLAN tags are being used over a subsequent path. If a packet
travels over a 6-hop path, it carries one DSCP value and two VLAN tags at the end.
In this way, rule misses on data plane is prevented for packets traversing a 6-hop path.
We need two rules per ingress port: one for checking if DSCP field is unused, and the
other to add VLAN tag otherwise, thus still keeping low switch rule overheads.
Given a 12-bit link ID space (i.e., 4,096 link IDs), the scheme supports a fat-tree
topology with 72-port switches (about 93K servers). Since DSCP field is additionally
used for VL2, the scheme can support a VL2 topology with 62-port switches (roughly
19K servers).
Instant trap of suspiciously long path. PathDump by design supports identifying
and trapping packets traversing a suspiciously long path. When a packet traverses one
such path, it cannot help but carry at least three tags. An attempt to parse IP layer
for forwarding at switch ASIC would cause a rule miss and the packet is sent to the
controller. The controller then can immediately identify the suspiciously long path.
We leverage this ability of PathDump to implement a real-time routing loop detection
application (see §5.4.5).
5.3.2 Server stack
The modules in the server stack conduct three tasks mainly. The first is to extract and
store the path information embedded in the packet header. Next, a query processing
module receives queries from the controller, consumes the stored path data and pro-
vides responses. The final task is to do active monitoring of flows’ performance and
prompt raise of alerts to the controller.
Trajectory information management. The trajectory information base (TIB) is a
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Figure 5.2: Trajectory information update procedure.
repository where packet trajectory information is stored. Because storing path infor-
mation of individual packets can waste too much disk space, we do per-path aggre-
gation given a flow. In other words, we maintain unique paths and their associated
counts for each flow. First, a packet is classified based on the usual 5-tuple flow ID
(i.e., <srcIP, dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, proto>). Then, a path-specific classification is
conducted. Figure 5.2 illustrates an overall procedure of updating TIB.
When a packet arrives at a server, we first retrieve its metadata (flow ID, path
information (i.e., link IDs) and bytes). Because the path information is irrelevant to
the upper layer protocols, we strip it off from the packet header in Open vSwitch
(OVS) before it is delivered to the upper stack via the regular route. Next, using the
flow ID and link IDs together as a key, we create or update a per-path flow record in
trajectory memory. Note that link IDs do not represent a complete end-to-end path
yet. Each record contains flow ID, link IDs, packet and byte counts and flow duration.
That is, one per-path flow record corresponds to statistics on packets of the same flow
that traversed the same path. Thus, at a given point in time, more than one per-path
flow record can be associated with a flow. Similar to NetFlow, if FIN or RST packet is
seen or a per-path flow record is not updated for a certain time period (e.g., 5 seconds),
the flow record is evicted from the trajectory memory and forwarded to the trajectory
construction sub-module.
The sub-module then constructs an end-to-end path with link IDs in a per-path flow
record. It first looks up the trajectory cache with srcIP and link IDs. If there is a cache
hit, it immediately converts the link IDs into a path. If not, the module maps link IDs
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to a series of switches by referring to a physical topology, and builds an end-to-end
path. It then updates the trajectory cache with (srcIP, link IDs, path). In this process, a
“static” physical network topology graph suffices, and there is no need for dynamically
updating it unless the topology changes physically. Finally, the module writes a record
(<flow ID, path, stime, etime, #bytes, #pkts>) to TIB.
We add to OVS about 150 lines of C code to support the trajectory extraction and
store function, and run the modified OVS on DPDK [3] for high-speed packet process-
ing (e.g., 10 Gbps). The module is implemented with roughly 600 lines of C++ code.
We build TIB using MongoDB [7].
Query processing. PathDump maintains TIB in a distributed fashion (across all servers
in the datacenter). The controller sends server agents a query, composed of PathDump
APIs (§5.2.1), which in turn processes the TIB data and returns results to the controller.
The querying mechanism is composed of about 640 lines of Python code.
Depending on debugging applications, the controller needs to consult more than
one TIB. For instance, to check path conformance of a packet or flow, accessing only
one TIB is sufficient. On the other hand, some debugging queries (e.g., load imbalance
diagnosis; see §5.4.2) need path information from all distributed TIBs.
To handle these different needs properly, we implement two types of query mecha-
nisms: (i) direct query and (ii) multi-level query. The former is a query that is directly
sent to one specific TIB by the controller. Inspired by Dremel [67] and iMR [65], we
design a multi-level query mechanism whereby the controller creates a multi-level ag-
gregation tree and distributes it alongside a query. When a server receives query and
tree, it performs two tasks: (i) query execution on local TIB and (ii) redistribution of
both query and tree.
In general, multi-level data aggregation mechanisms including ours can be inef-
fective in improving response times when the data size is not large and there is no
much data reduction during aggregation along the tree. In §6.6, we present the tradeoff
through two multi-level queries—flow size distribution and top-k flows.
Finally, when a query is executed, the latest TIB records relevant to the query
may reside in the trajectory memory, yet to be exported to the TIB. We handle this by
creating an IPC channel and allowing the server agent to look up the trajectory memory.
Not all debugging applications require to access the trajectory memory. Instead, the
alerts raised by Alarm() trigger the access to the memory for debugging at even
finer-grained time scales.













Figure 5.3: Workflow of PathDump.
Active monitoring module. Timely triggering of a debugging process requires fast
detection of symptoms on network problems. Servers are a right vantage point to
instantly sense the symptoms like TCP timeouts, high retransmission rates, large RTT
and low throughput.
We thus implement a monitoring module at server that checks TCP connection
performance passively, and promptly raises alerts to the controller in the advent of
abnormal TCP behavior. Specifically, by using tcpretrans script in perf-tools5,
the module checks the packet retransmission of individual flows at regular intervals
(configured by installing a query). If packet retransmissions are observed more than a
configured frequency, an alert is raised to the controller, which can subsequently take
actions in response. Thus, this active TCP performance monitoring allows fast trou-
bleshooting. We exploit the alert functionality to expedite debugging tasks such as
silent packet drop localization (§5.4.3), blackhole diagnosis (§5.4.4) and TCP perfor-
mance anomaly diagnosis (§5.4.6).
In addition, network behavior desired by operators can be expressed as network
invariants (e.g., maximum path length), which can be installed on end-hosts using
install(). This module uses Alarm() to inform any invariant’s violation as
depicted in §5.2.3.
5.3.3 PathDump controller
PathDump controller plays two roles: installing flow rules on switches and executing
debugging applications.
It installs flow rules in switches that append link IDs in the packet header (using
push_vlan output action) in order to enable packet trajectory tracing. This is one-
time task when the controller is initialized, and the rules are not modified once they are
5https://github.com/brendangregg/perf-tools







Expected path Actual path
Src MAC S6-S7 S2-S3Dst MAC
Two VLAN tags containing trajectory info
Link failure
X
Figure 5.4: An example of path conformance check. The dotted green line is
an expected path and the red line is an actual path that packet traverses.
installed. We use switches that support a pipeline of flow tables and that are therefore
compatible with OpenFlow specification v1.3.0.
Debugging applications can be executed under two contexts as depicted in Figure 5.3:
(i) event-driven, and (ii) on-demand. It is event-driven when the controller receives
alerts from the active monitoring module at end-hosts. The other, obvious way is that
the operator executes debugging applications on demand. Queries and results are ex-
changed via direct query or multi-level query. The controller consists of about 650
lines of Python code.
5.4 Applications
PathDump can support various debugging applications for datacenter network prob-
lems including both persistent and transient ones (see Table 5.2 for a comprehensive
list of debugging applications). In this section, we highlight a subset of those applica-
tions.
5.4.1 Path conformance check
A path conformance test is to check whether an actual path taken by a packet conforms
to operator policy. To demonstrate that, we create an experimental case shown in
Figure 5.4. In the figure, the intended path of a packet is a 4-hop shortest path from
server A to B. However, a link failure between switches S3 and S4 makes S3 forward
the packet to S6 (we implement a simple failover mechanism in switches with a few
flow rules). As a result, the packet ends up traversing a 6-hop path. The PathDump
agent in B is configured with a predicate, as a query (as depicted in §5.2.3), that a
6-hop or longer path is a violation of the path conformance policy. The agent detects
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Application Description PathDump PathQuery[75] Everflow[112] NetSight[47] TPP[51]
Loop freedom [47] Detect forwarding loops 3 3 3 3 ?
Load imbalance Get fine-grained statistics of
3 3 3 3 3
diagnosis [112] all flows on set of links
Congested link Find flows using a congested
3 3 3 3 3
diagnosis [75] link, to help rerouting
Silent blackhole Find switch that drops all
3 3 3 3 7
detection [112, 75] packets silently
Silent packet Find switch that drops
3 3 3 3 7
drop detection [112] packets silently and randomly
Packet drops Localize packet drop sources
3 3 3 3 3
on servers [112] (network vs. server)
Overlay loop Loop between SLB and
7 3 3 3 ?
detection [112] physical IP
Protocol bugs [112]
Bugs in the implementation
3 3 3 3 ?
of network protocols
Isolation [47]
Check if hosts are allowed
3 3 3 3 3
to talk
Incorrect packet Localize switch that modifies
7 3 ? 3 7
modification [47] packet incorrectly
Waypoint Identify packets not passing
3 3 3 3 3
routing [47, 75] through a waypoint
DDoS Get statistics of DDoS
3 3 3 3 3
diagnosis [75] attack sources
Traffic matrix [75]
Get traffic volume between
3 3 3 3 3
all switch pairs in a switch
Netshark [47]
Nework-wide path-aware
3 3 3 3 3
packet logger
Max path No packet should exceed
3 3 3 3 3
length [47] path length of size n
Table 5.2: Debugging applications supported by existing tools and PathDump.
The table assumes that Everflow performs per-switch per-packet mirroring. Of
course, this will have much higher bandwidth requirements than the network
traffic itself. If Everflow uses the proposed sampling to minimize bandwidth
overheads, many of the above applications will not be supported by Everflow.
such packets in real time and alerts the controller to the violation along with the flow
key and trajectory.
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(c) Flow size distribution
Figure 5.5: Load imbalance diagnosis. (a) illustrates a load imbalance case.
(b) shows, as reference, the load imbalance rate between links 1 and 2. (c)
shows the flow size distribution built by querying all TIBs.
5.4.2 Load imbalance diagnosis
Datacenter networks employ load-balancing mechanisms such as ECMP and packet
spraying [35] to exploit numerous equal-cost paths. However, when these mecha-
nisms work poorly, uneven load splits can hurt throughput and flow completion time.
PathDump can help narrow down the root causes of load imbalance problems, which
we demonstrate using two load-balancing mechanisms: (i) ECMP and (ii) packet
spraying.
ECMP load-balancing. This scenario (Figure 5.5(a)) assumes that a poor hash func-
tion always creates collisions among large flows. For the scenario, we configure switch
SAg g in pod 1 such that it splits traffic based on flow size. Specifically, if a flow is larger
than 1 MB in size, it is pushed onto link 1. If not, it is pushed onto link 2. Based on
the web traffic model in [21], we generate flows from servers in pod 1 to servers in
the remaining pods. As a metric, we use imbalance rate, λ= (Lmax/L−1)×100 (%)
where Lmax is the maximum load on any link and L is the mean load over all links [80].
Figure 5.5(b) shows the load imbalance rate between the two links measured every
5 seconds for 10 minutes. During about 80% of the time, the imbalance rate is 40%
or higher. With the load imbalance diagnosis application in §5.2.3, PathDump issues
a multi-level query to all servers and collects byte counts of flows that visited those
two links. As shown in Figure 5.5(c), flow size distributions on the two links are
sharply divided around 1 MB. With flow IDs and their sizes in the TIBs, operators can
reproduce this load imbalance scenario for further investigation.
This scenario illustrates how PathDump handles a persistent problem. The appli-
















Figure 5.6: Traffic distribution of a flow along four different paths under bal-





































Figure 5.7: Performance of the silent random packet drop debugging algo-
rithm. Average recall and precision are presented over 10 runs. The network
load is set to 70% and each faulty interface drops packets at 1% rate. The
numbers (i.e., 1, 2 and 4) in legend denote the number of faulty interfaces.
cation can be easily extended for tackling transient ECMP hash collisions among long
flows by exploiting the TCP performance alert function.
Packet spraying. In this scenario, packets of a flow are split among four possible
equal-cost paths between a source and destination. For demonstration, we create two
cases: (i) a balanced case and (ii) an imbalanced case. In a balanced case, the split
process is entirely random, thereby ensuring fair load-balance, whereas in an imbal-
anced case, we configure switches so that more packets are deliberately forwarded to
one of the paths (i.e., Path 3 in Figure 5.6). The flow size is set to 100 MB. Figure 5.6
is drawn using per-path statistics of the flow obtained from the destination TIB. As
shown in the figure, operators can check whether packet spraying works well or not.
In case of poor load-balancing, they can tell which path (more precisely, which link)
is under- or over-utilized. The per-packet path tracing ability of PathDump allows this



































(b) Loss rate = 1%
Figure 5.8: Time taken to reach 100% recall and precision. The numbers (i.e.,
1, 2 and 4) in legend denote the number of faulty interfaces. The error bar is
standard error, i.e., σ/
p
n where σ is standard deviation and n is the number
of runs (= 10).
level of detailed analysis. For real-time monitoring, it is sufficient to install a query
(using install()) that monitors the traffic amount difference among subflows.
5.4.3 Silent random packet drops
We implement the silent packet drop debugging application as described in §5.2.3 and
conduct experiments in a 4-ary fat-tree topology, where each end-host generates traffic
based on the same web traffic model. We configure 1-4 randomly selected interfaces
such that they drop packets at random. We run the MAX-COVERAGE algorithm
and evaluate its performance based on two metrics: recall and precision. Recall is
#T Ps
#T Ps+#FNs while precision is
#T Ps
#T Ps+#F Ps where true positive is denoted as TP, false
negative as FN, and false positive as FP.
In our experiment, as time progresses, the number of alerts received by the con-
troller increases; so does the number of failure signatures. Hence, from Figure 5.7, we
observe the accuracy (both recall and precision) also increases accordingly; the recall
increases faster than the precision. It is clear from Figure 5.8, as loss rate or network
load increase, the controller receives alerts from end-hosts at higher rate, and thus the
algorithm takes less time to obtain 100% recall and precision, making it possible to
debug the silent random packet drops fast and accurately.
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5.4.4 Blackhole diagnosis
We demonstrate how PathDump reduces a debugging search space with a blackhole
scenario in the network with a 4-ary fat-tree topology where packet spraying is de-
ployed. Again, we generate the same background traffic used in §5.4.3 to create noises
in the debugging process. We create a 100 KB TCP flow and its packets are randomly
routed through four possible paths and test two cases.
Blackhole at an aggregate-core link. Obviously, the subflow traffic passing the black-
hole link is all dropped. The controller receives an alarm from PathDump agent at
sender in 1 sec, immediately retrieves all TIB records for the flow and finds one record
for the dropped subflow missing. While examining the paths found in TIB records, it
finds that one path did not appear in the TIB. Since only one path (hence, one subflow)
was impacted, it produces three switches as a potential culprit: core switch, source and
destination aggregate switches (thus avoiding the search of all 10 switches in the four
paths).
Blackhole at a ToR-aggregate link in the source pod. This blackhole impacts two
subflows. The controller identifies two paths that impacted the two subflows using the
same way as before. By joining the two paths, the controller can pick four common
switches, which should be examined with higher priority.
Note that if more number of flows (and their subflows) are impacted by the black-
hole, PathDump can localize the exact source of the blackhole.
5.4.5 Routing loop debugging
PathDump debugs routing loop in real-time by trapping a suspiciously long path in the
network. As discussed in §5.3.1, a packet carrying more than two tags is automatically
directed to the controller. This feature is a foundation of making routing loops naturally
manifest themselves at the controller. More importantly, the fact that the controller has
a direct control over suspicious packets makes it possible to detect routing loops of any
size.
Real timeliness. We create a 4-hop routing loop as shown in Figure 5.9(a). Specif-
ically, switch S4 is misconfigured and all core switches are configured to choose an
alternative egress port except the ingress port of a packet. In the figure, switches from
S2 to S5 constitute the loop. Under this setup, it takes about 47 ms on average until the
controller detects the loop. When the packet trapped in this loop ends up carrying three
tags (see Figures 5.9(b)–5.9(d)) and appears at the controller, two of the tags have the



































Figure 5.9: Debugging a routing loop. (a) A routing loop is illustrated. (b) A
packet carries a VLAN tag whose value is an ID for link S2−S3 appended by
S3. (c) S4 bounces the packet to S5; S5 forwards the packet to one remaining
egress port (to S2) while appending an ID for link S4−S5 to the packet header.
(d) S3 appends a third tag of which the value is a ID for link S2−S3; at S4,
the packet is automatically forwarded to the controller since ASIC in switches
only recognizes two VLAN tags whilst the packet carries three; at this stage,
the controller immediately detects the loop by finding the repeated link S2−S3
from the packet header.
same link ID (S2−S3 in Figure 5.9(d)). Hence, the loop is detected immediately at this
stage.
Detecting loops of any size. In this scenario, we create a 6-hop routing loop (not
shown for brevity). The controller finds no repeated link IDs from three tags when
it sees the packet for the first time. The controller locally stores the three tags, strips
them off from the packet header, and sends the packet back to the switch. Since the
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Figure 5.10: Diagnosis of TCP outcast. Unfairness of throughput is shown in
(a). In (b), the communication graph is mapped onto a physical topology, and
edge weight is the number of flows arriving at an input port. Both data sets
are made available from TIB.
packet is trapped in the 6-hop loop, it will have another set of three tags and be for-
warded to the controller. This time, comparing link IDs in previous and current tags,
the controller observes that there is at least one repeated link ID and detects the loop.
The whole process took ∼115 ms. Detecting even larger loops involves exactly the
same procedure.
5.4.6 TCP performance anomaly diagnosis
PathDump can diagnose incast [29] and outcast [83] problems in a fine-grained manner
although they are transient. In particular, we test a TCP outcast scenario. For a realistic
setup, we generate the same type of TCP background traffic used in §5.4.4. In addition
to that, 15 TCP senders send data to a single receiver for 10 seconds. Thus, as shown
in Figure 5.10(b), a flow from f1 and 14 flows from f2− f15 arrive on two different
input ports at switch T . They compete for the same output port at the switch toward
receiver R. As a result, these flows experience the port blackout phenomenon, and the
flow from f1 sees the most throughput loss (see [83] for more details).
Every 200 ms (default TCP timeout value) the server agents run a query that gener-
ates alerts when their TCP flows repeatedly retransmit packets. The diagnosis applica-
tion at the controller starts to work when it sees a minimum of 10 alerts from different
sources to a particular destination. Since all alerts specify R as receiver, the application
requests flow statistics (i.e., bytes, path) from R and diagnoses the root cause for high
alerts. It first analyzes the throughput for each sender (Figure 5.10(a)) and constructs a
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path tree for all 15 flows (Figure 5.10(b)). It then identifies that the flow from f1 (one
closest to the receiver) is most highly penalized. PathDump concludes the TCP unfair-
ness stems from the outcast because these patterns fit the outcast’s profile. We observe
that the application initiates its diagnosis in 2-3 seconds since the onset of flows and
finishes it within next 200 ms.
5.5 Evaluation
We first study the performance of direct and multi-level queries in terms of response
time and data overheads. We then evaluate CPU and memory overheads at end-host in
processing packet stream and in executing queries.
5.5.1 Experimental setup
We build a real testbed that consists of 28 physical servers; each server is equipped
with Xeon 4-core 3.1 GHz CPU and a dual-port 1 GbE card. Using the two interfaces,
we separate management channel from data channel. The controller and servers com-
municate with each other through the management channel to execute queries. Each
server runs four docker containers (in total, 112 containers). Each container is assigned
one core and runs a PathDump agent to access TIB in it. In this way, we test up to 112
TIBs (i.e., 112 end-hosts). We only refer to container as end-host during the query
performance evaluation. Each TIB has 240K flow entries, which roughly corresponds
to the number of flows seen at a server for about an hour. We estimate the number
based on the observation that average flow inter-arrival time seen at server is roughly
15 ms (∼67 flows/sec) [55].
For multi-level query execution, we construct a logical 4-level aggregation tree
with 112 end-hosts. Our PathDump controller sits on the top of the tree (level 0). Right
beneath the controller are 7 nodes or end-hosts (level 1). Each first-level node has, as
its child, four nodes (level 2), each of which has four nodes at the bottom (level 3).
For the packet progressing overhead experiment, we use another server equipped
with a 10 GbE card. In this test, we forward packets from all other servers to a virtual
port in DPDK vSwitch via the physical 10GbE NIC.
5.5.2 Query performance
We compare the performance of direct query with that of multi-level query. To under-
stand which type of query suits well to a debugging application, we measure two key
metrics: i) end-to-end response time, and ii) total data volume generated. We test two













































Figure 5.11: Average end-to-end response time and traffic amount of a flow
size distribution query.
queries—flow size distribution of a link and top-k flows. For the top-k flows query, we
set k to 10,000. Results are averaged over 20 runs.
Results. Through these experiments, we make two observations (confirmed via Fig-
ures 5.11 and 5.12) as follows.
1) When more servers are involved in a query, multi-level query is in general better
than direct query. Figure 5.11(a) shows that multi-level query initially takes longer
than direct query. However, the response time gap between the two gets smaller as the
number of servers increases. This is due to three reasons. First, the aggregation time
(the time to aggregate responses at the controller) of direct query is always larger than
that of multi-level query. Second, the aggregation time of direct query linearly grows
in proportion to the number of end-hosts whereas that of multi-level query gradually
grows. Lastly, network delays of both queries change little regardless of the number of
servers.
2) If aggregation reduces response data amount substantially, multi-level query is
more efficient than direct query. When multi-level query is employed for computing
the top-k flows, (ni−1) ·k number of key-value pairs are discarded at level i−1 dur-
ing aggregation where ni is the number of nodes at level i (i < 3). A massive data
reduction occurs through the aggregation tree. Hence, the data amount exchanged in
multi-level query is similar to that in direct query (Figure 5.12(b)). Moreover, the com-
putation overhead for aggregation is distributed across multiple intermediate servers.
On the contrary, in direct query, the controller alone has to process a large number of
key-value pairs (i.e., k ·n3 where n3 is the total number of servers used). Hence, the



















































































(b) Throughput in million-packets per second
Figure 5.13: Forwarding throughput of PathDump and vSwitch. Each bar rep-
resents an average over 30 runs.
majority of the response time is attributed to computation at the controller, and the
response time grows linearly as the number of servers increases (Figure 5.12(a)). Due
to the horizontal scaling nature of multi-level query, its response times remain steady
regardless of the number of servers. In summary, these results suggest that multi-level
query can scale well even for a large cluster and direct query is recommended when a
small number of servers are queried.
5.5.3 Overheads
Packet processing. We generate traffic by varying its packet size from 64 to 1500 bytes.
Each packet carries 1-2 VLAN tags. While keeping about 4K flow records (roughly
equivalent to 100K flows/sec at a rack switch connected to 24 hosts) in the trajectory
memory, PathDump does about 0.8–3.6M lookups/updates per second (0.8M for 1500B
packets and 3.6M for 64B). Under these conditions, we measure average throughput
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in terms of bits and packets per second over 30 runs.
From Figure 5.13, we observe that PathDump introduces a maximum of 4% through-
put loss compared to the performance of the vanilla DPDK vSwitch. The figure
omits confidence intervals as they are small. In all cases, the throughput difference
is marginal. Note that due to the limited CPU and memory resources allocated, DPDK
vSwitch itself suffers throughput degradation as packet size decreases. Nevertheless,
it is clear that PathDump introduces minimal packet processing overheads atop DPDK
vSwitch.
Query processing. We measure CPU resource demand for continuous query process-
ing at end-host. The controller generates a mix of direct and multi-level queries con-
tinuously in a serialized fashion (i.e., a new query after receiving response for previous
one). We observe that less than 25% of one core cycles is consumed at end-host. As
datacenter servers are equipped with multi-core CPUs (e.g., 18-core Xeon E5-2699 v3
processor), the query processing introduces relatively less overheads.
Storage. PathDump only needs about 10 MB of RAM at a server for packet trajectory
decoding, trajectory memory and trajectory cache. It also needs about 110 MB of
disk space to store 240K flow entries (roughly equivalent to an hour’s worth of flows
observed at a server).
5.6 Limitations
Debugging network problems. PathDump does not require network switches to per-
form complex operations, yet it supports a large class of debugging problems. Table 5.2
shows a list of debugging applications supported by PathDump, except two; Overlay
loop detection and incorrect packet modification. Overlay loop could be formed in the
following way; a packet’s destination server decaps the outer header (VXLAN) and
mistakenly injects the packet back into the network, then a network load balancer en-
caps the VXLAN header, and again forwards to the destination server. With the packet
trajectory tracing technique like CherryPick, decoder at an end-host may not have all
the information to reconstruct the loop path. Eventually, PathDump could not pin-point
the origin of overlay loop (i.e., load balancer).
PathDump allows to view a sub-set of all properties of a packet at each hop. For
instance, it can tell switch input and output port that the packet traversed, but not the
packet header values and the matched flow table version. Suppose, one of the switches
in the path modifies the packet headers incorrectly, then PathDump does not give a clue
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of which is the problematic switch in the packet’s path.
Impact of packet drops. PathDump end-hosts reconstruct the packet trajectory from
the link IDs present in the packet header. However, a packet may not reach the desti-
nation for a multitude of reasons, including packet drops due to network congestion,
a black hole, or a faulty interface. PathDump resolves the packet drop problem by ex-
ploiting the fact that many datacenters typically perform load balancing (using ECMP
or packet spraying). In particular, we show in §5.4.3 that the correlation of paths of
all impacted flows allows to localize the culprit switch, or link, and the localization
accuracy improves as path data of poor flows accumulates. However, in the absence of
sufficient data (e.g., only few flows observed the problem), the accuracy would be very
low.
End-host agent. User applications are not aware of the link IDs embedded into the
packet headers. End-host agent strips link IDs off from the packet headers, updates
per-path flow statistics (flowID and path together as a key), then forwards the packet
to upper layers. Currently, the agent is implemented and evaluated in OpenVswitch
(OVS), both kernel and DPDK versions. For completeness, we should have tested the
agent overhead in other virtual switch platforms such as mSwitch [48], Hyper-V virtual
switch [5], etc.
Switch flow rules. In section §4.2.3, we have only presented OpenFlow table entries at
each switch layer for tracing packet trajectory. In a heterogeneous network setup that
has both traditional (operate in L2/L3 mode) and OpenFlow-compatible switches from
different switch vendors, enabling packet trajectory tracing may require a different set
of table entries to be installed.
5.7 Summary
This chapter presents PathDump, an end-host based network debugger that carefully
partitions the debugging functionality between the edge devices and the network switches
(in contrast to an entirely in-network implementation used in existing tools). PathDump
does not require network switches to perform complex operations like dynamic switch
rule updates, per-packet per-switch log generation, packet sampling, packet mirror-
ing, etc., and yet helps debug a large class of network problems over fine-grained
time-scales. Evaluation of PathDump over operational network testbeds comprising
of commodity network switches and end-hosts show that PathDump requires minimal
data plane resources and end-host resources.
Chapter 6
Distributed Network Monitoring and
Debugging with SwitchPointer
6.1 Introduction
Debugging network problems require resources like compute, memory, and network
bandwidth to collect and monitor telemetry data. As networks evolve to a large number
of end-points, higher speeds, and higher utilizations, the amount of resources required
to monitor the telemetry data also increases. Moreover, debugging performance prob-
lems (e.g., delays, packet drops) need to inspect every packet and collect telemetry data
at packet level [112]. This is in contrast to sampled flow-level information provided by
existing monitoring tools such as NetFlow, sFlow. However, packet-level monitoring
requires even more resources. Increasingly, many data centers need real-time monitor-
ing systems to detect thousands of network events within a few milliseconds [71]. For
example, we can use these systems to install predicates that are checked against each
packet and report telemetry data of those packets violating the predicates. Enabling
real time diagnosis adds to the resources required for network debugging.
Given the ever growing resource requirements, where should the telemetry data
necessary to debug the problems should be captured? On the one hand we have in-
network monitoring approaches that collect and monitor telemetry data at switches [13,
63, 107, 64, 50], and query this data using new software or hardware interfaces [74,
41, 75, 6, 51]. Though they provide high network visibility, but often limited by avail-
able data plane resources. For example commodity switches have only 10’s of Mbits of
SRAM for monitoring [74] and strict limits on types of per-packet operation [63]. Lim-
ited by these resources, these approaches have to rely on highly aggregated data [74], or
66
Chapter 6. Distributed Network Monitoring and Debugging with SwitchPointer 67
selectively sampled network traffic [112], or approximate counters [107] which some-
times may not accurate enough to diagnose network problems (§6.2).
At the other extreme, we have end-host based monitoring and debugging approaches
(e.g., PathDump, Trumpet [71], Pingmesh [44]). These approaches exploit the re-
sources to collect and monitor telemetry data, and use this data to debug network prob-
lems. Also, hosts offer the programmability needed to implement various monitoring
and debugging functionalities, without need for specialized hardware. But, they lose
the benefits of network visibility offered by in-network monitoring approaches.
We present SwitchPointer, a network monitoring and debugging system that in-
tegrates the best of the two worlds — resources and programmability of end-host
based approaches, and the visibility of in-network approaches. SwitchPointer exploits
end-host resources and programmability to collect and monitor telemetry data, and
to trigger spurious network events (e.g., using existing end-host based systems like
PathDump (Chapter 5). The key contribution of SwitchPointer is to efficiently enable
network visibility for such end-host based systems by using switch memory as a “direc-
tory service” — in contrast to in-network approaches where switches store telemetry
data necessary to diagnose network problems, SwitchPointer switches store pointers
to end-hosts where the relevant telemetry data is stored. The distributed storage at
switches thus operates as a distributed directory service; when an end-host triggers a
spurious network event, SwitchPointer uses the distributed directory service to quickly
filter the data (potentially distributed across multiple end-hosts) necessary to debug the
event.
SwitchPointer design. The key design choice of thinking about network switch storage
as a directory service rather than a data store allows SwitchPointer to efficiently solve
many problems that are hard or even infeasible for existing systems. For instance,
consider the network problems shown in Figure 6.1. We provide an in-depth discussion
in §6.2, but note here that existing systems are insufficient to debug the reasons behind
high latency, packet drops or TCP timeout problems for the red flow since this requires
maintaining temporal state (that is, flow IDs and packet priorities for all flows that the
red flow contends with in Figure 6.1(a)), combining state distributed across multiple
switches (required in Figure 6.1(b)), and in some cases, maintaining state even for
flows that do not trigger network events (for the blue flow in Figure 6.1(c)).













Figure 6.1: Three example network problems. Green, blue and red flows have de-
creasing order of priority. Red flow observes high latency (or even TCP timeout due to
excessive packet drops) due to: (a) contention with many high priority flows at a sin-
gle switch; (b) contention with multiple high priority flows across multiple switches;
and (c) cascading problems — green flow (highest priority) delays blue flow, resulting
in blue flow contending with and delaying red flow (lowest priority). Please see more
details in §6.2.
SwitchPointer is able to solve such problems using a simple design (detailed dis-
cussion in §6.4):
• Switches divide the time into epochs and maintain a pointer to all end-hosts to
which they forward the packets in each epoch;
• Switches embed their switchID and current epochID into the packet header be-
fore forwarding a packet;
• End-hosts maintain a storage and query service that allows filtering the headers
for packets that match a (switchID, epochID) pair; and,
• End-hosts trigger spurious events, upon which a controller (or an end-host) uses
pointers at the switches to locate the data necessary to debug the event.
SwitchPointer challenges. While SwitchPointer design is simple at a high-level, real-
izing it into an end-to-end system requires resolving several technical challenges. The
first challenge is to decide the epoch size — too small an epoch would require either
large storage (to store pointers for several epochs) or large bandwidth between the data
plane and the control plane (to periodically push the pointers to persistent storage);
too large an epoch, on the other hand, may lead to inefficiency (a switch may forward
packets to many end-hosts). SwitchPointer resolves this challenge using a hierarchical
Chapter 6. Distributed Network Monitoring and Debugging with SwitchPointer 69
data structure, where each subsequent level of the hierarchy stores pointers over ex-
ponentially larger time scales. We describe the data structure in §6.4.1.1, and discuss
how it offers a favourable tradeoff between switch memory and bandwidth, and system
efficiency.
The second challenge in realizing the SwitchPointer design is to efficiently maintain
the pointers at switches. The naïve approach of using a hash table for each level of the
hierarchy would either require large amount of switch memory or would necessitate
one hash operation per level per packet for the hierarchical data structure, making it
hard to achieve line rate even for modest size packets. SwitchPointer instead uses a
perfect hash function [2, 42] to efficiently store and update switch pointers in the hi-
erarchical data structure. Perfect hash functions require only 2.1 bits of storage per
end-host per-level for storing pointers and only one hash operation per packet (inde-
pendent of number of levels in the hierarchical data structure). We discuss storage and
computation requirements of perfect hash functions in §6.4.1.2.
The final two challenges in realizing SwitchPointer design into an end-to-end sys-
tem are: (a) to efficiently embed switchIDs and epochIDs into packet header; and (b)
handle the fact that switch and end-host clocks are typically not synchronized per-
fectly. For the former, SwitchPointer can of course use clean-slate approaches like
INT [6]; however, we also present a design in §6.4.1.3 that allows SwitchPointer to
embed switchIDs and epochIDs into packet header using commodity switches (un-
der certain assumptions). SwitchPointer resolves the latter challenge by exploiting the
fact that while the network devices may not be perfectly synchronized, it is typically
possible to bound the difference between clocks of any pair of devices within a data
center. This allows SwitchPointer to handle asynchrony by carefully designing epoch
boundaries in its switch data structures.
SwitchPointer contribution. We have implemented SwitchPointer into an end-to-end
system that currently runs over a variety of network testbeds comprising commodity
switches and end-hosts. Evaluation of SwitchPointer over these testbeds (§6.5, §6.6)
demonstrates that SwitchPointer can monitor and debug network events at sub-second
timescales while requiring minimal switch and end-host resources.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the problems that moti-
vates the need for SwitchPointer, Section 6.4 elaborates on SwitchPointer design, and
§6.5 presents network problems supported by SwitchPointer which are hard or infea-
sible to debug for existing systems. Finally, Section 6.6 has SwitchPointer evaluation
results.
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6.2 Motivation
In this section we discuss several network problems that motivate the need for SwitchPointer.
6.2.1 Too much traffic
The first class of problems are related to priority-based and microburst-based con-
tention between flows.
Priority-based flow contention. Consider the case of Figure 6.1(a), where a low-
priority flow competes with many high-priority flows on an output port. As a result,
the low priority flow may observe throughput drop, high inter-packet arrival times, or
even TCP timeouts.
To demonstrate this problem, we set up an experiment. We create a low-priority
TCP flow between two hosts A and B that lasts for 100ms. We then create 5 batches of
high-priority UDP bursts; each burst lasts for 1ms and has increasingly larger number
of UDP flows (m in Figure 6.1(a)) all having different source-destination pairs. We use
Pica8 P-3297 switches in our experiment; the switch allows us to delay processing of
low-priority packets in the presence of a high-priority packet.
Figure 6.2(a) demonstrates that high-priority UDP bursts hurt the throughput and
latency performance of the TCP flow significantly. With increasingly larger number of
high-priority flows in the burst, the TCP flow observes increasingly more throughput
drop eventually leading to starvation (e.g., 0 Gbps for ∼10 ms in case of 16 UDP
flows). The figure also shows that increasing number of high-priority flows in the
burst results in increasingly larger inter-arrival times for packets in the TCP flow. The
reduced throughput and increased packet delays may, at the extreme, lead to TCP
timeout.
Microburst-based flow contention. We now create a microburst based flow con-
tention scenario, where congestion lasts for short periods, from hundreds of microsec-
onds to a few milliseconds, due to bursty arrival of packets that overflows a switch
queue. To achieve this, we use the same set up as priority-based flow contention with
the only difference that we use a FIFO queue instead of a priority queue at each switch
(thus, all TCP and UDP packets are treated equally). The results in Figure 6.2(b) show
a throughput drop similar to priority-based flow contention, but a slightly different plot
for inter-packet arrival times — as expected, the increase in inter-packet delays is not
as significant as in priority-based flow contention since all packets get treated equally.
Limitations of existing techniques. The two problems demonstrated above can be
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(a) Throughput (left) and inter-packet arrival time (right) of a low-
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(b) Throughput (left) and inter-packet arrival time (right) of a TCP
flow under microburst-based flow contention.
Figure 6.2: Too much traffic problem depicted in Figure 6.1(a). Five UDP burst
batches are introduced with a gap of 15 ms between each other. The gray lines high-
light the five batches, all of which last for 1 ms. The number in circle denotes the
number of UDP flows used in each batch.
detected and diagnosed using specialized switch hardware and interfaces [74]. With-
out custom designed hardware, these problems can still be detected at the destination
of the suffering flow(s), but diagnosing the root cause is significantly more challeng-
ing. Packet sampling based techniques would miss microbursts due to undersampling;
switch counter based techniques would not be able to differentiate between the priority-
based and microburst-based flow contention; and finally, since diagnosing these prob-
lems requires looking at flows going to different end-hosts, existing end-host based
techniques [71, 99] are insufficient since they only provide visibility at individual end-
hosts.
6.2.2 Too many red lights
We now consider the network problem shown in Figure 6.1(b). Our set up uses a low-
priority TCP flow from host A to host F (the red flow) that traverses switches S1, S2


































(b) Throughput of flow A-F at S2
Figure 6.3: Too many red lights problem depicted in Figure 6.1(b). UDP is used for
flows B-D and C-E and TCP for flow A-F.
and S3. The TCP flow contends with two high-priority UDP flows (B-D and C-E),
each lasting for 400µs in a sequential fashion (that is, flow C-E starts right after flow
B-D finishes). Consequently, the TCP flow gets delayed for about 400µs at S1 due to
UDP flow B-D and another 400µs at S2 due to UDP flow C-E.
The result is shown in Figure 6.3. The destination of the TCP flow sees a sudden
throughput drop almost down to 200 Mbps. This is a consequence of performance
degradation accumulated across two switches S1 and S2 — Figures 6.3(a) and 6.3(b)
show that the throughput is around 600Mbps at S1 and around 200 Mbps at S2 (at
around 6 ms time point). In fact, the problem is not limited to reduced throughput for
the TCP flow — taken to the extreme, adding more “red lights” can easily result in a
timeout for the TCP flow.
Limitations of existing techniques. The too many red lights problem highlights the
importance of combining in-network and end-host based approaches to network mon-
itoring and debugging.
Indeed, it is hard for purely in-network techniques to detect the problem — switches
are usually programmed to collect relevant flow- or packet-level telemetry information
if a predicate (e.g., throughput drop is more than 50% or queuing delay is larger than
1ms) is satisfied, none of which is the case in the above phenomenon. Since the per-
formance of the TCP flow degrades gradually due to contention across switches, the
net effect becomes visible closer to the end-host of the TCP flow.
On the other hand, existing end-host based techniques allow detecting the through-
put drop (or for that matter, the TCP timeout); however, these techniques do not pro-
vide the network visibility necessary to diagnose the gradual degradation of throughput
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Figure 6.4: Traffic cascades problem depicted in Figure 6.1(c). Throughput of flows
(a) without traffic cascades; (b) with traffic cascades. UDP is used for flows B-D and
A-F, and TCP for flow C-E.
across switches in the too-many-red-lights phenomenon.
6.2.3 Traffic cascades
Finally, we discuss the traffic cascade phenomenon from Figure 6.1(c). Here, we have
three flows, B-D, A-F and C-E, with flow priorities being high, middle and low, respec-
tively. Flows B-D and A-F use UDP and last for 10ms each whereas flow C-E uses
TCP and transfers 2MB of data. A cascade effect happens when the high-priority flow
B-D affects the middle-priority flow A-F which subsequently affects the low-priority
flow C-E. Specifically, if flow B-D and flow A-F do not contend at switch S1, the flow
A-F will depart from switch S2 before flow C-E arrives resulting in no flow contention
in the network (Figure 6.4(a)). However, due to contention of flow B-D and flow A-F
at switch S1 (for various reasons, including B-D being rerouted due to failure on a dif-
ferent path), flow A-F is delayed at switch S1 and ends up reducing the throughput for
flow C-E at switch S2 (Figure 6.4(b)).
Limitations of existing techniques. Diagnosing the root cause of the traffic cascade
problem is challenging for both in-network and for end-hosts based techniques. It not
only requires capturing the temporal state (flowIDs and packet priorities for all con-
tending flows) across multiple switches, but also requires to do so even for flows that


















Figure 6.5: (a) Switch divides time into epochs and for each epoch, switch maintains
pointer to end-hosts seen in that epoch. In addition, switch also embeds telemetry
data (e.g., switchID, epochID) within the packet header. (b) Analyzer uses pointer to
end-hosts at switches to identify end-hosts that has relevant telemetry data to debug
network problems.
do not observe any noticeable performance degradation (e.g., the B-D flow). Existing
in-network and end-host based techniques fall short of providing such functionality.
6.2.4 Other SwitchPointer use cases
There are many other network monitoring and debugging problems for which in-
network techniques and end-host based techniques, in isolation, are either insufficient
or inefficient (in terms of data plane resources). We have compiled a list of such
network problems along with a detailed description of how SwitchPointer is able to
monitor and diagnose such problems in [14].
6.3 Overview
SwitchPointer integrates the benefits of end-host based and in-network approaches
into an end-to-end system for network monitoring and debugging. To that end, the
SwitchPointer system has three main components. This section provides a high-level
overview of these components and how SwitchPointer uses these components to mon-
itor and debug network problems. Figure 6.5 gives an overview of SwitchPointer sys-
tem.
SwitchPointer Switches. The first component runs at network switches and is respon-
sible for three main tasks: (1) embedding the telemetry data into packet header; (2)
maintaining pointers to end hosts where the telemetry data for packets processed by
the switch are stored; and (3) coordinating with an analyzer for monitoring and debug-
ging network problems.
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SwitchPointer switches embed at least two pieces of information in packet headers
before forwarding a packet. The first is to enable tracing of packet trajectory, that is, the
set of switches traversed by the packet; SwitchPointer uses solutions similar to [98, 99]
for this purpose. The second piece of information is to efficiently track contending
packets and flows at individual ports over fine-grained time intervals. To achieve this,
each SwitchPointer switch divides (its local view of) time into epochs and embeds into
the packet header the epochID at which the packet is processed. SwitchPointer can of
course use clean-slate approaches like INT [6] to embed epochIDs into packet headers;
however, we also present a design in §6.4.1.3 that extends the techniques in [98, 99] to
efficiently embed these epochIDs into packet headers along with the packet trajectory
tracing information.
Embedding path and epoch information within the packet headers alone does not
suffice to debug network problems efficiently. Once a spurious network event is trig-
gered, debugging the problem requires the ability to filter headers contributing to that
problem (potentially distributed across multiple end hosts); without any additional
state, filtering these headers would require contacting all the end hosts. To enable effi-
cient filtering of headers contributing to the triggered network problem, SwitchPointer
uses distributed storage at switches as a directory service — switches store “pointers”
to destination end hosts of the packets processed by the switch in different epochs.
Once an event is triggered, this directory service can be used to quickly filter out head-
ers for packets and flows contributing to the problem.
Using epochs to track contending packets and flows at switches, and storing point-
ers to destination end-hosts for packets processed in each epoch leads to several design
and performance tradeoffs in SwitchPointer. Indeed, too large an epoch size is not de-
sirable — with increasing epoch size, a switch may forward packets to increasingly
many end-hosts within an epoch, leading to inefficiency (at an extreme, this would
converge to trivial approach of contacting all end-hosts for filtering relevant headers).
Too small an epoch size is also undesirable since with increasing number of epochs,
each switch would require either increasingly large memory (SRAM for storing the
pointers) or increasingly large bandwidth between the data plane and the control plane
(for periodically transferring the pointers to persistent storage).
SwitchPointer achieves a favorable tradeoff between switch memory, bandwidth be-
tween the data plane and the control plane, and the efficiency of debugging network
problems using a hierarchical data structure, where each subsequent level of the hier-
archy stores pointers over exponentially larger time scales. This data structure enables
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both real-time (potentially automated) debugging of network problems using pointers
for more recent epochs, and offline debugging of network problems by transferring
only pointers over coarse-grained time scales from the data plane to the control plane.
We discuss this data structure in §6.4.1.1. Maintaining a hierarchy of pointers also
leads to challenges in maintaining an updated set of pointers while processing packets
at line rate; indeed, a naïve implementation that uses hash tables would require one op-
eration per packet per level of hierarchy to update pointers upon each processed packet.
We present, in §6.4.1.2, an efficient implementation that uses perfect hash functions to
efficiently maintain updated pointers across the entire hierarchy using just one opera-
tion per packet (independent of number of levels in the hierarchical data structure).
SwitchPointer End-hosts. SwitchPointer, similar to recent end-host based monitor-
ing systems [99, 71], uses end hosts to collect and monitor telemetry data carried
in packet headers, and to trigger spurious network events. SwitchPointer uses Path-
Dump (Chapter 5) to implement its end-host component; however, this requires sev-
eral extensions to capture additional pieces of information (e.g., epochIDs) carried in
SwitchPointer’s packet headers and to query headers. We describe SwitchPointer’s end-
host component design and implementation in §6.4.2.
SwitchPointer Analyzer. The third component of SwitchPointer is an analyzer that
coordinates with SwitchPointer switches and end-hosts. The analyzer can either be
colocated with the end-host component, or on a separate controller. A network opera-
tor, upon observing a trigger regarding a spurious network event, uses the analyzer to
debug the problem. We describe the design and implementation of the SwitchPointer
analyzer in §6.4.3.
An example for using SwitchPointer:
We now describe how a network operator can use SwitchPointer to monitor and debug
the too many red lights problem from Figure 6.1 and §6.2.2. The destination end-host
of the victim TCP flow A-F detects a large throughput drop and triggers the event. The
operator, upon observing the trigger, uses the analyzer module to extract the end-hosts
that store the telemetry data relevant to the problem — the analyzer module internally
queries the destination end-host for flow A-F to extract the trajectory of its packets
(switches S1, S2 and S3 in this example) and the corresponding epochIDs, uses this
information to extract the pointers from the three switches (for corresponding epochs),
and returns the relevant pointers corresponding to the end-hosts that store the relevant
headers for flows that contended with the victim TCP flow (D and E in this example).
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The operator then filters the relevant headers from the end-hosts to learn that flow A-F
contended with flow B-D and C-E, and can interactively debug the problem using these
headers. SwitchPointer debugs other problems in a similar way (more details in §6.5).
6.4 SwitchPointer
In this section, we discuss design and implementation details for various SwitchPointer
components.
6.4.1 Switches
SwitchPointer provides the network visibility necessary for debugging network prob-
lems by using the memory at network switches as a distributed directory service, and
by embedding telemetry information in the packet headers. We now describe the data
structure stored at and packet processing pipeline of SwitchPointer switches.
6.4.1.1 Hierarchical data structure for pointers
SwitchPointer switches divide their local view of time into epochs and enable tracking
of contending packets and flows at switches by storing pointers to destination end-
hosts for packets processed in different epochs. SwitchPointer stores these pointers
using a hierarchical data structure, where each subsequent level of the hierarchy stores
pointers over exponentially larger time scales. We describe this data structure and
discuss how it achieves a favorable tradeoff between switch memory (to store pointers)
and bandwidth between data plane and control plane (to periodically transfer pointers
from switch memory to persistent storage).
Figure 6.6 shows SwitchPointer’s hierarchical data structure with k levels in the hi-
erarchy. Suppose the epoch size is α ms. At the lowermost level, the data structure
stores α set of pointers, each corresponding to destinations for packets processed in
one epoch; thus the set of pointers at the lowermost level provide a per-epoch infor-
mation on end-hosts storing headers to all contending packets and flows over an α2 ms
period. In general, at level h (1≤ h≤ k−1), the data structure stores α set of point-
ers corresponding to packets processed in consecutive αh ms intervals. The top level
stores only one set of pointers corresponding to packets processed in last αk ms of time
period.
The hierarchical data structure, by design, maintains some redundant information.
For instance, the first set of pointers in level h+1 correspond to packets processed in
last αh+1 ms of time period, collectively similar to all the set of pointers in level h.
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Figure 6.6: SwitchPointer’s hierarchical data structure for storing pointers. For each
packet that a switch forwards, SwitchPointer stores a pointer to the packet’s destina-
tion end-host along a hierarchy of k levels. For epoch size αms, level h (1≤ h≤ k−1)
stores pointers to destination end-hosts for packets processed in last consecutive αh
epochs (that is, αh+1 ms) across α set of pointers. The topmost level stores only one
set of pointers corresponding to packets processed in last αk ms.
It is precisely this redundancy that allows SwitchPointer to achieve a favorable trade-
off between switch memory and bandwidth. We return to characterizing this tradeoff
below, but note that pointers at the lower level of the hierarchy provide a more fine-
grained view of packets and flows contending at a switch and are useful for real-time
diagnosis; the set of pointers on the upper levels, on the other hand, provide a more
coarse-grained view and are useful for offline diagnosis.
SwitchPointer allows pointers at all levels to be accessed by the analyzer under
a pull model. For instance, suppose the epoch size is α= 10 and the data structure
has k = 3 levels. Then, each set of pointers at level 1 correspond to 10 ms of time
period while those at level 2 correspond to 100 ms of time period. If a network oper-
ator wishes to obtain the headers corresponding to packets and flows processed by the
switch for last 50 ms (i.e., 5 epochs), it can pull the five most recent set of pointers from
level 1; for last 150 ms period, the operator can pull the two most recent pointers from
level 2 (which, in fact, correspond to 200 ms time period). In addition to supporting
access to the hierarchical data structure using a pull model, SwitchPointer also pushes
the topmost level of pointers to the control plane for persistent storage every αk ms
which can then be used for offline diagnosis of network events. The toplevel pointers
provide coarse-grained view of contending packets and flows at switches which may
be sufficient for offline diagnosis but using a push model only for the topmost level
pointers significantly reduces the requirements on bandwidth between the data plane
and the control plane.
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Tradeoff. The hierarchical data structure, as described above, exposes a tradeoff be-
tween switch memory and the bandwidth between the data plane and the control plane
via two parameters — k and α. Specifically, let the storage needed by a set of pointers
to be S bits (this storage requirement depends on the maximum number of end-hosts in
the network, and is characterized in next subsection); Then, the overall storage needed
by the hierarchical data structure is α · (k−1) ·S+S bits. Moreover, since only the
topmost pointer is pushed from the data plane to the control plane (once every αk ms),
the bandwidth overhead of SwitchPointer is bounded by S× (103/αk) bps. For a fixed
network size (and hence, fixed S), as k and α are increased, the memory requirements
increase and the bandwidth requirements decrease. We evaluate this tradeoff in §6.6
for varying values of k and α; however, we note that misconfiguration of k and α
values may result in longer diagnosis time (the analyzer may touch more end-hosts to
filter relevant headers) but does not result in correctness violation.
6.4.1.2 Maintaining updated pointers at line rate
We now describe the technique used in SwitchPointer to minimize the switch memory
requirements for storing the hierarchical data structure and to minimize the number of
operations performed for updating all the levels in the hierarchy upon processing each
packet.
Strawman: a simple hash table. A plausible solution for storing each set of pointers
in the hierarchical data structure is to use a hash table. However, since SwitchPointer
requires updating k set of pointers upon processing each packet (one at each level
of hierarchy), using a standard hash table would require k operations per packet in
the worst case. This may be too high a overhead for high-speed networks (e.g., with
10Gbps links). One way to avoid such overhead is to use hash tables with large number
of buckets so as to have a negligible collision probability. Using such a hash table
would reduce the number of operations per packet to just one (independent of number
of levels in the hierarchy); however, such a hash table would significantly increase the
storage requirements. For instance, consider a network with m destinations; given a
hash table with n buckets, the expected number of collisions under simple uniform
hashing is m− (n−n(1−1/n)m). Suppose that m= 100K and the target number of
collisions is 0.001m (i.e., 0.1% of 100K keys). To achieve this target, the number of
buckets in the hash table should be close to 50 million, 500× larger than the number
of keys. Thus, this strawman approach becomes quickly infeasible for our hierarchical
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data structure — it would either require multiple operations per packet to update the
data structure or would require very large switch memory.
Our solution: Minimal perfect hash function. Our key observation is that the maxi-
mum number of end-hosts in a typical datacenter is known a priori and that it changes
at coarse time scales (hours or longer). Therefore, we can construct a minimal perfect
hash function to plan ahead on the best way to map destinations to buckets to avoid
hash collisions completely. In fact, since each level in the hierarchy uses the same per-
fect hash function, SwitchPointer needs to perform just one operation per packet to find
the index in a bit array of size equal to the maximum number of destinations; the same
index needs to be updated across all levels in the hierarchy. Upon processing a packet,
the bit at the same index across the bit array is set in parallel. Lookups are also easy
— to check if a packet to a particular destination end-host was processed in an epoch,
one simply needs to check the corresponding bit (given by the perfect hash function)
in the bit array.
The minimal perfect hash function provides O(1) update operation and expresses
a 4-byte IP address with 1 bit (e.g., 100Kbits for 100K end-hosts). While an addi-
tional space is required to construct a minimal perfect hash function, it is typically
small (70 KB and 700 KB for for 100K and 1M end-hosts respectively; see §6.6.1).
Moreover, while constructing a perfect hash function is a computationally expensive
task, small storage requirement of perfect hash tables allow us to recompute the hash
function only at coarse-grained time intervals — temporary failures of end-hosts do
not impact the correctness since the bits corresponding to those end-hosts will simply
remain unused. For resetting pointers at level h, an agent at the switch control plane
updates a register with the memory address of next pointer every αh ms and resets its
content. The agent conducts this process for pointers at all levels.
6.4.1.3 Embedding telemetry data
SwitchPointer requires two pieces of information to be embedded in packet headers.
The first is the trajectory of a packet, that is, the set of switches (i.e., switchIDs) tra-
versed by the packet between the source and the destination hosts. The second is epoch
information (i.e., epochID) on when a packet traverses those switches.
SwitchPointer extends the link sampling idea from CherryPick and PathDump, to
efficiently enable packet trajectory tracing and epoch embedding for commonly used
datacenter network topologies (e.g., clos networks like fat-tree, leaf-spine and VL2)
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Figure 6.7: Telemetry data embedding using two VLAN tags using a modified version
of the technique used in CherryPick. See §6.4.1.3 and §6.4.2.1 for discussion.
without any hardware modifications. Specifically, it is shown in Chapter 4 that an end-
to-end path in typical datacenter network topologies can be represented by selectively
picking a small number of key links. For instance, in a fat-tree topology the technique
reconstructs a 5-hop end-to-end path by selecting only one aggregate-core link and
embedding its linkID into the packet header. For embedding epochIDs in addition to
the linkID, we extend the technique that relies on IEEE 802.1ad double tagging. When
a linkID is added to the packet header using a VLAN tag, we add an epochID using
another tag (see Figure 6.7).
The number of rules for embedding linkID increases linearly with respect to the
number of switch ports whereas only one flow rule is for epochID embedding. How-
ever, the switch needs a rule update once every epoch — as the epoch changes, the
switch should be able to increment epochID and add a new epochID for incoming
packets. A commodity OpenFlow switch that we use is capable of updating flow rules
every 15 ms, giving us a lower bound on α granularity for commodity switches.
We note that the limitations on supported topologies and α granularity in our imple-
mentation over commodity switches are merely an artifact of today’s switch hardware
— it is possible to use SwitchPointer with clean-slate solutions such as INT [6] to sup-
port trajectory tracing and epoch embedding over arbitrary topologies.
6.4.2 End-hosts
SwitchPointer uses PathDump to collect and monitor telemetry data carried in packet
headers, and to trigger spurious network events. In this subsection, we discuss the ex-
tensions needed in PathDump to capture additional pieces of information (e.g., epochIDs)
carried in SwitchPointer’s packet headers and to query headers.
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6.4.2.1 Decoding telemetry data
When a packet arrives at its destination, the destination host extracts the telemetry data
from the packet header. If the network supports clean-slate approaches like INT [6],
this is fairly straight forward. For implementation using commodity switches (using
techniques discussed in §6.4.1.3), the host extracts two VLAN tags containing the
switchID and the epochID associated with the switchID. Using the switchID, the end-
to-end path can be constructed using techniques in CherryPick and PathDump, giving
us a list of switches visited by the packet. Next, we decide a list of epochIDs for
each of those switches. However, since only one epochID is available at the end-host,
it is hard to determine the missing epochIDs for those switches correctly. Thus, we
set a range of epochs that the switches should examine. Specifically, we may need to
examine max_delay/α number of pointers at each switch due to uncertainty in epoch
identification.
Let∆ denote the a maximum one hop delay and ε be a maximum time drift among
all switches. Given epochID ei of switch S and an end-to-end path, the epochIDs for
switches along the path are identified as follows.
For the upstream switches of switch S, the epoch range is [ei− (ε+ j ·∆)/α,ei+
ε/α] and for the downstream switches of S, it is [ei−ε/α,ei+(ε+ j ·∆)/α], where j
is hop difference between an upstream (or downstream) switch and switch S. Suppose
α= 10 ms, ε= α and ∆= 2 ·α. For instance, in the example of Figure 6.7, we set
[ei−3,ei+1] for switch S2, [ei−1,ei+3] for S4, and so forth. This provides a rea-
sonable bound due to two reasons. First, a maximum queuing delay is within tens of
milliseconds in the datacenter network (e.g., 14 ms in [20]). Second, millisecond-level
precision is sufficient as SwitchPointer epochs are of similar granularity.
6.4.2.2 Event trigger and query execution
The end-host also has an agent that communicates with and executes queries on behalf
of the analyzer. The agent is implemented using a microframework called flask [4],
and implements a variety of techniques (similar to those in existing end-host based
systems, PathDump and Trumpet [71]) to monitor spurious network events.
6.4.3 Analyzer
The analyzer is also implemented using flask microframework. It communicates with
both switch and end-host agents. From the switch agent, the analyzer obtains pointers




















Figure 6.8: Debugging time of the priority-based flow contention problem de-
picted in Figure 6.2(a). SwitchPointer is able to monitor and debug the prob-
lem in less than 100ms. We provide a break down of the diagnosis latency
later in Figure 6.13.
to end-hosts for epoch(s). From the end-host agent, it receives alert messages, and
exchanges queries and responses. Another responsibility is that it constructs a minimal
perfect hash function whenever there are permanent changes in the number of end-
hosts in the network, especially when end-hosts are newly added. It then distributes
the minimal perfect hash function to all the switches in the network. The analyzer also
does pre-processing of pointers by leveraging network topology, flow rules deployed
in the network, etc. For example, to diagnose the network problem experienced by a
flow, the analyzer filters out irrelevant end-hosts in the pointer if the paths between the
flow’s source and those end-hosts do not share any path segment of the flow. This way,
the analyzer reduces search radius, i.e., number of end-hosts that it has to contact.
6.5 Applications
In this section, we demonstrate some key monitoring applications SwitchPointer sup-
ports.
6.5.1 Too much traffic
We debug the problem discussed in §6.2 using SwitchPointer. This problem include
two different cases: (i) priority-based flow contention and (ii) microburst-based flow
contention. The debugging processes of both cases are similar; the only difference is
the former case requires the analyzer to examine flow’s priority value. Thus, we only
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discuss the former case.
Figure 6.8 shows the breakdown of times it took to diagnose the priority-based
flow contention case. First, we instrument hosts with a simple trigger that detects
drastic throughput changes. The trigger measures throughput every 1 ms interval and
generates an alert to the analyzer if throughput drop is more than 50%. The problem
detection takes less than 1 ms, thus almost invisible from the figure (3-4 ms for the
microburst-based contention case). Then, it takes 2-3 ms to send the analyzer an alert
and to receive an acknowledgment. The alert contains a series of <switchID, a list
of epochIDs, a list of byte counts per epoch> tuples that tell the analyzer when and
where packets of the TCP flow visit. The analyzer uses the switchIDs and epochIDs,
and obtains relevant pointers from switches. In this scenario, it only takes about 7-8 ms
to retrieve a pointer from one switch.
Next, the analyzer learns hosts encoded in the pointer, and diagnoses the problem
by consulting them; it collects telemetry data such as UDP flow’s priority, the number
of bytes in UDP flow during the epoch when the TCP flow experiences high delay.
The analyzer finally draws a conclusion that the presence of high-priority UDP flows
aggravated the performance of the low-priority TCP flow. As shown in Figure 6.8,
the time for the diagnosis increases as the number of consulted hosts (i.e., each UDP
flow is destined to a different host) increases. Although not too large, the diagnosis
overhead inflation pertains to the implementation of connection initiation; we discuss
this matter and its optimization in §6.6.2.
6.5.2 Too many red lights
This problem illustrated in Figure 6.1(b) (for its behavior, see Figure 6.3) requires spa-
tial correlation of telemetry data across multiple switches for diagnosis. While this
problem is challenging to existing tools, SwitchPointer easily diagnoses it as follows.
First, destination F triggers an alert to the analyzer in no time (∼1 ms) by using
our throughput drop detection heuristic introduced in §6.5.1. The alert contains IDs for
switches S1,S2 and S3 and their corresponding epochID ranges. The analyzer contacts
all of the switches and retrieves pointers that match the epoch IDs for each switch in
10 ms, and then conducts diagnosis (another 20 ms) by obtaining telemetry data for
UDP flows B-D and C-E from hosts D and E, respectively. The analyzer finds out that
low (A-F) and high prority (B-D and C-E) flows have at least one common epochID,
and finally concludes (in about 30 ms) that both flows B-D and C-E contributed to the
actual impact on the TCP flow.
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Figure 6.9: Latency for diagnosing load imbalance problem.
6.5.3 Traffic cascades
This problem is a more challenging problem to existing tools because debugging it
requires spatial and temporal correlation of telemetry data (see Figure 6.1(c) for the
problem illustration and Figure 6.4(b) for its behavior). SwitchPointer diagnoses the
problem as follows.
First, the low-priority TCP flow C-E observes a large throughput drop at around
26 ms (see Figure 6.4(b)) and triggers an alert along with switchIDs and corresponding
epoch details. Then, the analyzer retrieves pointers that match with epochIDs from
S2 and S3, contacts F and finds out the presence of middle-priority flow A-F on S2
caused the contention in ∼25 ms. Since flow A-F has middle-priority, the analyzer
subsequently examines pointers from switches (i.e., S1 and S2) along the path of flow
A-F in order to see whether or not the flow was affected by some other flows. From
a pointer from switch S1, the analyzer comes to know that flow B-C made flow A-F
delayed, which in turn had flows A-F and C-E collide. This part of debugging takes
another 25 ms. Hence, the whole process takes about 50 ms in total.
Of course, in a large datacenter network, debugging this kind of problem can be
more complex than the example we studied here. Therefore, in practice the debugging
process may be an off-line task (with a pointer at a higher level that covers many
epochs) rather than an online task. However, independent of whether it is an off-line or
online task, SwitchPointer showcases, with this example, that it is feasible to diagnose
network problems that need both spatial and temporal correlation.
6.5.4 Load imbalance diagnosis
To demonstrate the way SwitchPointer works for diagnosing load imbalance, we create
the same problematic setup used in Section 5.4.2. In that setup, a switch that is con-
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figured to malfunction, forwards traffic unevenly to two egress interfaces; specifically,
packets from flows whose size is less than 1 MB are output on one interface; other-
wise, packets are forwarded to the other interface. We vary the number of flows from
4 to 96. Each flow is destined to a different end-host. Using this setup, we can under-
stand how the number of end-hosts contacted by the analyzer impacts SwitchPointer’s
performance.
The debugging procedure is similar to that of other problems we already studied.
This problem is detected by monitoring interface byte counts per second. The analyzer
fetches the pointers corresponding to the most recent 1 sec. It then obtains the end-
hosts in the pointers, and sends them a query that computes a flow size distribution
for each of the egress interfaces of the switch. Finally, the analyzer finds out that
there is a clean separation in flow size between two distributions. Figure 6.9 shows the
diagnosis time of running a query as a function of the number of end-hosts consulted
by the analyzer. The diagnosis time increases almost linearly as the analyzer consults
more end-hosts. Since this trend comes from the same cause, we refer to §6.6.2 for
understanding individual factors that contribute to the diagnosis time.
6.6 Evaluation
We prototype SwitchPointer on top of Open vSwitch [8] over Intel DPDK [3]. To
build a minimal perfect hash function, we use the FCH algorithm [42] among others
in CMPH library [2]. We also implement the telemetry data extraction and epoch
extrapolation module (§6.4.2.1) on OVS. The module maintains a list of flow records;
one record consists of the usual 5-tuple as flowID, a list of switchIDs, a series of epoch
ranges that correspond to each switchID, byte/packet counts and a DSCP value as flow
priority. This flow record is initially maintained in memory and flushed to a local
storage, implemented using MongoDB [7]. We now evaluate SwitchPointer in terms of
switch overheads and query performance under real testbeds that consist of 96 servers.
6.6.1 Switch overheads
To quantify switch overheads, we vary epoch duration (α ms), the number of levels
in a pointer (k), the number of IP addresses (n) and packet size (p). We set up two
servers connected via a 10GE link. From one server, we generate 100K packets, each
of which has a unique destination IP (hence, 100K flows); we play those 100K packets
repeatedly to the other server where SwitchPointer is running using one 3.1 GHz CPU
core. Under the setup, we measure i) throughput, ii) the amount of memory to keep
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Figure 6.10: For smaller packet sizes, SwitchPointer is unable to sustain line
rate due to overheads of perfect hash function. SwitchPointer is able to achieve
line rate for a 10GE interface for packets of size 256bytes and more.
pointers on data plane, iii) bandwidth to offload pointers from SRAM (data plane) to
off-chip storage (control plane), and iv) pointer recycling period.
Throughput. We compare SwitchPointer’s throughput with that of vanilla OVS (base-
line) over Intel DPDK. We set k = 1 and 5. Here one pointer of SwitchPointer is
configured to record 100K unique end-hosts. We then measure the throughput of
SwitchPointer while varying p. Our current implementation in OVS processes about
7 million packets per second. From Figure 6.10, we observe that OVS and both con-
figurations of SwitchPointer achieve a full line rate (∼9.99 Gbps) when p≥ 256 bytes.
In contrast, when p< 256 bytes, both OVS and SwitchPointer face throughput degra-
dation. For example, when p is 128 bytes, OVS achieves about 9.29 Gbps whereas
SwitchPointer’s throughput is about 22% less than that of OVS. However, since an av-
erage packet size in data centers is in general larger than 256 bytes (e.g., 850 bytes [24],
median value of 250 bytes for hadoop traffic [87]), the throughput of SwitchPointer can
be acceptable. We also envision that a hardware implementation atop programmable
switch [25, 51] would eliminate the limitation of a software version.
Memory. Perfect hash functions account for about 70 KB (n= 100K) and 700 KB
(n = 1M). In addition, n also governs the pointer’s size: 12.5 KB (n = 100K) and
125 KB (n= 1M). Together SwitchPointer requires to have 82.5 KB and 825 KB, re-
spectively. These are the minimum amount of memory requirement for SwitchPointer.
Figure 6.11(a) shows the memory overhead; the memory requirement increases in pro-
portion to each of k and α. When n= 1M, α= 10 and k= 3, SwitchPointer consumes
3.45 MB; for n= 100K, it is only 345 KB.
Bandwidth. In contrast to memory overhead, the bandwidth requirement of system
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Figure 6.11: Overheads of SwitchPointer. At (n, α) in the legend, n denotes the
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Figure 6.12: Recycling period of a pointer when k= 3.
bus between SRAM and off-chip storage decreases as we increase k and α because
larger values of those parameters make the pointer flush less frequent. In particular, k
has a significant impact in controlling the bandwidth requirement; increasing it drops
the requirement exponentially. For n= 1M and α= 10 (the most demanding setting in
Figure 6.11(b)), the bandwidth requirement reduces from 100 Mbps (k=1) to 10 Mbps
(k= 2).
The results in Figures 6.11(a) and 6.11(b) present a clear tradeoff between mem-
ory and bandwidth. Depending on the amount of available resources and user’s re-
quirements, SwitchPointer provides a great flexibility in adjusting its parameters. For
instance, if memory is a scarce resource, it may be better to keep k≤ 3 and α≤ 10.
Pointer recycling period. Except for top level pointers, pointers are recycled after
all the pointers on the same layer are used. The pointer recycling period at level h is
expressed as α(αh−1) ms where 1≤ h< k. Figure 6.12 shows a tradeoff between α





















































Figure 6.13: Top-100 query response time. Most of SwitchPointer latency over-
heads are due to connection initiation requests from the analyzer to the end-
hosts and can be improved with a more optimized RPC implementation.
and k. As expected, the recycling period exponentially increases as the level increases
(when α= 10, the recycling period of a pointer at level 1 is 90 ms and it is 900 ms
at level 2). Because too small α may always let SwitchPointer end up accessing a
higher-level pointer, α should be chosen carefully.
6.6.2 Query performance
We now evaluate the query performance of SwitchPointer, which we compare with
that of PathDump (baseline). We run a query that seeks top-k flows in a switch in our
testbed where there are 96 servers. The key difference between SwitchPointer and Path-
Dump is that SwitchPointer knows which end-hosts it needs to contact but PathDump
does not. Thus, PathDump executes the query from all the servers in the network. To
see the impact of the difference, we vary the number of servers that contain telemetry
data of flows that traverse the switch.
From Figure 6.13 we observe that the response time of SwitchPointer gradually
increases as the number of servers increases. On the other hand, PathDump always has
the longest response time as it has to contact all 96 servers anyway. Both of them only
have a similar response time when all the servers have relevant flow records and thus
SwitchPointer has to contact all of them.
A closer look reveals that most of the response time is because of connection initia-
tion for both SwitchPointer and PathDump. In our current implementation, the analyzer
creates one thread per server to initiate connection when a query should be executed.
This on-demand thread creation delays the execution of query at servers. This is an im-
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plementation issue, not a fundamental flaw in design. Thus, it can be addressed with
proper technique such as thread pull management. However, since PathDump must
contact all the servers regardless of whether or not the servers have useful telemetry
data, it wastes servers’ resources. On the contrary, SwitchPointer only spends right
amounts of server resources, thus offering a scalable way of query execution.
6.7 Limitations
Supporting arbitrary range queries. SwitchPointer switch divides time into epochs
and maintains pointers to end-hosts that the switch has seen in that epoch. Section 6.4
provided discussion on the right epoch duration (too small vs, too large), and the need
for hierarchical data structure to store pointers. Such a data structure supports both
real-time and off-line queries. In brief, for a given time range query, SwitchPointer
responds with a minimum number of pointers that covers the range. However, range
queries sometimes may not sufficient to accurately identify contending flows and pack-
ets. So, we envision support for arbitrary time range queries (not multiple of epoch
duration (α) set initially) would improve usability of SwitchPointer. More work on the
design is required to close the gap between epoch duration and arbitrary time range
queries.
Inaccuracies in determining epochs. There are many ways to embed telemetry data
(switch ID, epoch ID) into packet header. One idea is to use a clean state approach
like INT [51]. But INT has packet header space limitation in current deployments. In
this work, SwitchPointer extends the link sampling technique presented in CherryPick.
It works for popular data center topologies using commodity OpenFlow-compatible
switches. But, SwitchPointer does not provide the exact epoch at which a packet is
processed by pod switches (not present in core layer). Instead, it exploits the fact that
generally we can set bounds on clock difference and maximum queuing delays be-
tween any pair of devices in a data center. So, using CherryPick, SwitchPointer can
only provides a range of switch epoch IDs for pod switches. It requires more eval-
uation in a controlled environment to understand the impact of time drift or queuing
delay variations on determining the epochs. Of course, embedding techniques like INT
would overcome inaccuracies and also simplifies determining the switch epoch IDs.
Scalability. Due to limited resources at servers in our testbed, we could only evaluate
SwitchPointer’s throughput with 100K flows on a 10GE link. Our testbed has quad-
core servers equipped with modest memory (4MB) and 10GE interface cards. For
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scalability, throughput test could have evaluated up to one million flows (requires more
memory to generate and consume traffic at line rate) on a 40GE link.
6.8 Summary
This chapter presents SwitchPointer, a system that integrates the benefits of end-host
based approaches and in-network approaches to network monitoring and debugging.
SwitchPointer uses end-host resources and programmability to collect and monitor
telemetry data, and to trigger spurious network events. The key technical contribution
of SwitchPointer is to enable network visibility by using switch memory as a “direc-
tory service” — SwitchPointer switches use a hierarchical data structure to efficiently
store pointers to end-hosts that store relevant telemetry data. Using experiments on
real-world testbeds, we have shown that SwitchPointer efficiently monitors and debugs
a large class of network problems, many of which were either hard or even infeasible
with existing designs.
Chapter 7
Fault Localization in Large-Scale
Network Policy Deployment
7.1 Introduction
Software-defined Networking (SDN) enables flexible and intent-based policy manage-
ment [82, 92, 15, 41, 69, 102, 9]. As programmability offered by SDN makes network
management easier, troubleshooting network problems become increasingly challeng-
ing. An ideal troubleshooting tool for admins should allows to quickly detect, localize,
inspec, fix the network problem. In specific, the tool should quickly nail downs to the
part of the policy that the admin should further look at to fix observed failures. To-
wards this direction, we built Scout, an end-to-end system that automatically pinpoints
not only faulty policy objects, but also physical-level failures, the root cause for policy
objects to become faulty.
In the existing policy management frameworks [82, 15], low-level rules are built
from policy objects (in short, objects) such as marketing group, DB tier, filter, and so
on. Our study on a production cluster reveals that even one object can be used to create
TCAM rules for over thousands of endpoints. This implies that a fault of that single
object can lead to a communication outage for those numerous endpoints. In order
to find which particular part of the policy failure is the main cause, examining all of
the TCAM rules associated with the endpoints is a needle-in-a-haystack problem and
would be tedious.
Scout design. We call the problem of finding out the impaired parts of the policy as
a network policy fault localization problem, which we tackle via risk modeling [62].
We model risks as simple bipartite graphs that capture dependencies between risks
92
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(i.e., objects) and nodes (e.g., endpoints or end user applications) that rely on those
risks. We then annotate the risk models for those risks and nodes that are associated
with the observed failures. Using those models, we devise a greedy fault localization
algorithm that outputs a hypothesis, a minimum set of most-likely faulty policy objects
(i.e., risks) that explains most of the observed failures.
Scout challenges. At first glance, solving this policy fault localization problem looks
straightforward as a similar problem has been studied for IP networks [62]. However,
there are two key challenges. First, it is difficult to represent risks in the network pol-
icy as a single model. Solving many risk models can be computationally expensive.
In our modeling, we fortunately require two risk models only: switch risk model and
controller risk model (§7.3.2). We make the two models based on our observation
that faults of policy objects occur at two broad layers (controller and switch). If the
controller malfunctions, unsuccessful policy deployment can potentially affect all the
switches in the network (thus, controller risk model). On the contrary, a policy deploy-
ment failure can be limited to a switch [112, 44] if that switch only becomes faulty
(thus, switch risk model).
Our second challenge stems from the fact that the degree of impact on endpoints
caused by a faulty object varies substantially. When a fault event occurs, some objects
are responsible for all of the impacted endpoints. On the contrary, some other objects
cause trouble to a small fraction of total number of endpoints that rely on them. This
variety makes accurate fault localization difficult. An existing algorithm [62] tends to
choose policy objects in the former case while it treats objects in the latter case as input
noise. However, in our problem, some objects do belong to the latter case. To handle
this issue, Scout employs a 2-stage approach; it first picks objects only if all of their
dependent endpoints are in failure; next, for (typically a small number of) objects left
unexplained in the risk model, it looks up the change logs (maintained at a controller)
and selects the objects to which some actions are recently applied (§7.4). Despite its
simplicity, this heuristic effectively localizes faults (§7.6).
Scout contributions. Overall, the main contributions addressing fault localization
problem in this thesis are:
• We introduce and study a network policy fault localization problem (§7.2). This
is a new problem that gained little attention but is of utmost importance in oper-
ating a policy management framework safely.
• We introduce two risk models (switch and controller risk models) that precisely
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capture the characteristics of the problem and help its formulation.
• We devise a policy fault localization algorithm that quickly narrows down a small
number of suspicious faulty objects (§7.4). We then design and implement Scout
(§7.5), a system that conducts an end-to-end automatic fault localization from
failures on policy objects to physical-level failures that made the objects faulty.
• We evaluate Scout using a real production cluster and extensive simulations
(§7.6). Our evaluations show that Scout achieves 20-50% higher accuracy than
an existing solution and is scalable. Scout runs a large-scale controller risk model
of a network with 500 leaf switches, under 130 seconds in a commodity machine.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 presents the background to under-
stand network policy deployment procedure, Section 7.3 formulates the fault localiza-
tion problem with shared risk models, Section 7.4 describes the proposed algorithm
that localize faulty policy objects, and Section 7.5 presents an end-to-end system,




In general network policies dictate the way traffic should be treated in a network. In
managing network policies, tenant/admins should be able to express their intent on
traffic via a model and to enforce the policies at individual network devices. To en-
able more flexible composition and management of network policies, several frame-
works [82, 15, 9] present the network policies in an abstracted model (e.g., a graph) that
describes communication relationships among phyiscal/logical entities such as servers,
switches, middleboxes, VMs, etc.
Intent illustration. As an example, consider a canonical 3-tier web service that con-
sists of Web, App and DB servers (or VMs) as shown in Figure 7.1(a). Here the tenant
intent is to allow communication on specific ports between the application tiers, i.e.,
port 80 between Web and App, ports 80 and 700 between App and DB. A network
policy framework transforms intent of users (tenant, network admins, etc.) into an
abstracted policy as illustrated in Figure 7.1(b).
Network policy presentation. For driving our discussion, we here apply a network
policy abstraction model in [15], which is quite similar to other models (e.g., GBP [9],
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Figure 7.1: An example of network policy management framework. EP stands
for endpoint, and EPG denotes endpoint group.
PGA [82]); and our work for localizing faults in network policy management is ag-
nostic to policy abstraction model itself. Figure 7.1(b) illustrates a network policy (as
a graph represented with policy objects) transformed from the tenant intent shown in
Figure 7.1(a). We discuss each of those policy objects next.
An endpoint group (EPG) represents a set of endpoints (EPs), e.g., servers, VMs,
and middleboxes, that belong to the same application tier. A filter governs access
control between EPGs. This policy entity takes a whitelisting apporach, which by
default blocks all traffic in the absence of filters.
A mapping between EPGs and filters is indirectly managed by an object called
contract, which serves as a glue between EPGs and filters. A contract defines what
filters need to be applied to which EPGs. Thus, a contract enables easy modification of
filters. For example, in Figure 7.1(b), suppose EPG:App and EPG:DB no longer need
to talk to each other on port 700. One can simply remove “Filter: port 700/allow” from
the Contract:App-DB without need to modify the contract.
Finally, the scope of all EPGs in a tenant policy is defined using a layer-3 virtual
private network, realized with a virtual routing and forwarding (VRF) object.
Network policy deployment. A network policy should be realized through deploy-
ment. A centralized controller maintains the network policy and makes changes on it.
When updates (add/delete/modify) on a network policy are made, the controller com-
piles the new policy and produces instructions that consist of policy objects and the
update operations associated with the objects. The controller then distributes the in-
structions to respective switch agents. The switch agents also keep a local view on the
network policy to which the instructions from the controller are applied. The switch
agents transform any changes on the logical view into low-level TCAM rules.
Consider a network topology (Figure 7.1) where EP1 is attached to switch S1,









Figure 7.2: TCAM rules in switch S2. Note that here a rule is annotated with
object types in it for ease of exposition.
EP2 to S2 and EP3 to S3. Let us assume that EP1 ∈ EPG:Web, EP2 ∈ EPG:App and
EP3 ∈ EPG:DB. Putting it altogether, the controller sends out the instructions about
EPG:Web to switch S1 (as EP1 is connected to S1), those about EPG:App to switch S2,
and so forth. As the three switches receive the instructions on those EPGs for the first
time, they build a logical view from scratch (see Figure 7.1(c) for example). Hence,
a series of add operations invoke TCAM rule installations in each switch. Figure 7.2
shows access control list (ACL) rules rendered in TCAM of S2.
7.2.2 Network state inconsistency
Network policy enforcement is by nature a distributed process and involves the man-
agement of three key elements: (i) a global network policy at controller, (ii) a local
network policy at switch agent, and (iii) TCAM rules generated from the local policy.
Ideally, the states among these three elements should be equivalent in order for the
network to function as intended by admins.
In reality, these elements may not be in an equivalent state due to a number of
reasons. A switch agent may crash in the middle of TCAM rule updates. A temporal
disconnection between the controller and switch agent during the instruction push.
TCAM has insufficient space to add new ACL rules, which renders the rule installation
incomplete. The agent may run a local rule eviction mechanism, which even worsens
the situation because the controller may be unaware of the rules deleted from TCAM.
Even TCAM is simply corrupted due to hardware failure. All of these cases can create
a state mismatch among controller, switch agent and TCAM level, which compromises
the integrity of the network.
One approach to this issue is to make network policy management frameworks
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more resilient against failures. However, failures are inevitable, so is the network state
inconsistency.
7.3 Shared Risks in Network Policy
We exploit shared risk models for our network policy fault localization problem. The
shared risk model has been well studied in IP networks [62]. For instance, when a fibre
optic cable carries multiple logical IP links, the cable is recognized as a shared risk for
those IP links because the optical cable failure would make the IP links fail or perform
poorly.
Deploying a network policy also presents shared risks. A network policy comprises
policy objects (such as VRF, EPGs, contract, filter, etc). The relationship among those
objects dictates how a network policy must be realized. If an object is absent or ill-
represented in any of controller, switch agent and TCAM layers, all of EPG pairs that
rely on that object would be negatively impacted. Thus, these policy objects on which
a set of EPG pairs rely are shared risks in the network policy deployment.
Figure 7.2 depicts that a TCAM rule is expressed as a combination of objects pre-
sented in a logical model at switch S2. If the 5th and 6th TCAM rules in the figure are
absent from TCAM, all the traffic between EPG:App and EPG:DB via port 700 would
be dropped. The absence of correct rules boils down to a case where one or more
objects are not rendered correctly in TCAM; a corrupted TCAM may write a wrong
VRF identifier (ID) or EPG ID for those rules; S2 may drop the filter ‘port 700/allow’
from its logical view due to software bug. Such absence or mispresentation of objects
directly affect the EPG pairs that share the objects. Thus, shared risk objects for App-
DB EPG pair are VRF:101, EPG:App, EPG:DB, Contract:App-DB, Filter:80/allow,
and Filter:700/allow.
A key aspect of shared risks is that they can create different degree of damages to
EPG pairs. If an incorrect VRF ID is distributed from the controller to switch agents,
all pairs of EPGs belonging to the VRF would be unable to communicate. In con-
trast, if one filter is incorrectly deployed in one switch, the impact would be limited to
the endpoints in the EPG pairs that are directly connected to the switch (and to other
endpoints that might attempt to talk to those endpoints).
In a network policy, a large number of EPG pairs may depend on a shared risk
(object) and/or a single EPG pair may rely on multiple shared risk objects. These not
only signify the criticality of a shared risk but also the vulnerability of EPG pairs.
More importantly, a dense correlation between shared risks and EPG pairs makes it
















Figure 7.3: Number of EPG pairs per object.
promising to apply risk modeling techniques to fault localization of network policy
deployment.
To understand the degree of sharing between EPG pairs and policy objects, we
analyze policy configurations from a real production cluster that comprises about 30
switches and hundreds of servers. Figure 7.3 shows the cumulative distribution func-
tion on the number of EPG pairs sharing a policy object, from which we make the
following observations:
7.3.1 A case study in a production cluster
• A failure in deploying VRF would lead to a breakdown of a number of EPG
pairs. A majority of VRF objects has more than 100 EPG pairs. 10% VRFs are
shared by over 1,000 EPG pairs and 2-3% VRFs by over 10,000 EPG pairs.
• EPGs are configured to talk to many EPGs. About 50% of EPGs belong to more
than 100 EPG pairs, which implies that the failure of an EPG is communication
outage with a significant number of EPGs.
• The failure of a physical object such as switch would create the biggest impact
on EPG pairs. About 80% of switches maintain at least 1,000s of EPG pairs.
• Contract and filter are mostly shared by a small number of EPG pairs. 70% of
the filters and 80% of the contracts are used by less than 10 EPG pairs.
Overall, it is evident that failures in a shared risk affect a great number of EPG
pairs. Thus, spatial correlation holds promise in localizing problematic shared risks
among a huge number of shared risks in large-scale networks.


































(b) Controller risk model
Figure 7.4: Risk models for switch S2. When the 1st rule is missing from the
TCAM in S2 in Figure 7.2, the edges associated with the Web-App EPG pair are
marked as fail (details on §7.3.3).
7.3.2 Risk models
We adopt a bipartite graph model that has been actively used to model risks in the tra-
ditional IP network [62]. A bipartite graph demonstrates associations between policy
objects and the elements that would be affected by those objects. At one side of the
graph are policy objects (e.g., VRF, EPG, filter, etc.); and the affected elements (e.g.,
EPG pairs) are located at the other side. An edge between a pair of nodes in the two
parties is created if an affected element relies on a policy object under consideration.
In modeling risks for network policy, one design question is how to represent risks
in the 3-tier deployment hierarchy that involves controller, switch agent and TCAM.
During rule deployment, there are two major places that eventually cause the failure
of TCAM rule update—one from controller to switch agent and the other from switch
agent to TCAM. The former may cause global faults whereas the latter does local
faults. For instance, if the controller cannot reach out to a large number of switches
for some reason, the policy objects across those unreachable switches are not updated.
On the other hand, when one switch is unreachable, a switch agent misbehaves or
TCAM has hardware glitches, the scope of risk model should be restricted to a partic-
ular switch level. Thus, in order to capture global- and local-level risks properly, we
propose two risk models: (i) switch and (ii) controller risk model.
Switch risk model. A switch risk model consists of shared risks (i.e., policy objects)
and the elements (i.e., EPG pair) that can be impacted by the shared risks on a per-
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switch basis. The model is built from a network policy and the physical locations of
endpoints belonging to EPGs in the network. Figure 7.4(a) shows an example of switch
risk model for switch S2 given the local view on network policy in Figure 7.1(c). The
left-hand side in the model shows all EPG pairs deployed in switch S2. Each EPG pair
has an edge to those policy objects (on the right-hand side in the model) that it relies on
in order to allow traffic between endpoints in the EPG pair. For instance, the Web-App
EPG pair has outgoing edges to EPG:Web, EPG:App, VRF:101, Filter:port80/Allow,
and Contract:Web-App. An edge is flagged as either success or fail, soon discussed in
§7.3.3.
Controller risk model. A controller risk model captures shared risks and their rela-
tionships with vulnerable elements across all switches in the network. A controller
risk model is constructed in a similar manner of a switch risk model. In the con-
troller risk model, a switch ID and an EPG pair form a triplet (on the left-hand side in
Figure 7.4(b)). A triplet has edges to policy objects that the EPG pair relies on in that
specific switch. Since the same policy object can be present in more than one switch,
an EPG pair in multiple switches can have an edge to the object.
7.3.3 Augmenting risk models
In a conventional risk model, when an element affected by shared risks experiences a
failure, it is referred to as an observation. In case of switch risk model, an EPG pair is
an observation when endpoints in the EPG pair are allowed to communicate but fail to
do so.
In our work, an observation is made by collecting the TCAM rules (T-type rules)
deployed across all switches periodically and/or in an event-driven fashion, and by
conducting an equivalence check between logical TCAM rules (L-type rules) con-
verted from the network policy at the controller and the collected T-type rules. For
this, we use an in-house equivalence checker. The equivalence check is to compare
two reduced ordered binary decision diagrams (ROBDDs); one from L-type rules, and
the other from T-type rules. If both ROBDDs are equivalent, there is no inconsistency
between the desired state (i.e., the network policy) and actual state (i.e., the collected
TCAM rules). If not, the tool generates a set of missing TCAM rules that explains
the difference and that should have been deployed in the TCAM but absent from the
TCAM). Those missing rules allow to annotate edges in the risk models as failure,
thereby providing more details on potentially problematic shared risks. Note that sim-
ply reinstalling those missing rules is a stopgap, not a fundamental solution to address
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the real problem that creates state inconsistency.
Potentially, the L-T equivalence checker can produce a large number of missing
rules. As demonstrated by our study on dependencies between objects (§7.3.1 and
Figure 7.3), one ill-presented object at controller and/or switch agent can cause policy
violations for over thousands of EPG pairs and make thousands of rules missing from
the network. Unfortunately, it is expensive to do object-by-object checking present
in the observed violations. Thus, we treat all objects in the observed violations as a
potential culprit. We then mark (augment) the edges between the malfunctioning EPG
pair (due to the missing rule) and its associated objects in the violation as fail.
Figure 7.4(a) illustrates how the switch risk model is augmented with suspect ob-
jects if the 1st rule is missing from the TCAM in S2 in Figure 7.2. To pinpoint cul-
prit object(s), one practical technique is to pick object(s) that explains the observa-
tion best (i.e., the famous Occam’s Razor principle); in this example, EPG:Web and
Contract:Web-App would explain the problem best as they are solely used by the Web-
App EPG pair. The lack of the augmented data would make it hard to localize fault
policy objects as it suggests that all objects appear equally plausible. Note that the
example is deliberately made simple to ease discussion. In reality many edges be-
tween EPG pairs and shared risks can be marked as fail (again, see the high degree of
dependencies between objects from Figure 7.3).
7.4 Fault Localization
We now build a fault localization algorithm that exploits the risk models discussed in
§7.3. We first present a general idea, explain why the existing approach falls short in
handling the problem at hand and lastly describe our proposed algorithm.
7.4.1 General idea
In the switch risk model, for instance, an EPG pair is marked as fail, if it has at least
one failed edge between the pair and a policy object (see Figure 7.4(a)). Otherwise,
the EPG pair is success. Each EPG pair node marked as fail is an observation. A set
of observations is called a failure signature. Any policy object shared across multiple
EPG pairs becomes a shared risk.
If all edges to an object are marked as fail, it is highly likely that the failure of
deploying that object explains the observations present in the failure signature, and
such an object is added to a set called hypothesis. Recall in Figure 7.4(a) that the
EPG:Web and Contract:Web-App objects best explain the problem of Web-App EPG
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pair. On the other hand, other objects such as VRF:101 and EPG:App are less likely
to be the culprit because they are also shared by App-DB EPG pair which has no
problem. An ideal algorithm should be able to pick all the responsible policy objects
as a hypothesis.
In many cases, localizing problematic objects is not as simple as shown in Figure 7.4(a).
Multiple object failures can take place simultaneously. In such a case, it is prohibitive
to explore all combinations of multiple objects that are likely to explain all of the ob-
servations in a failure signature. Therefore, the key objective is to identify a minimal
hypothesis (in other words, a minimum number of failed objects) that explains most of
the observations in the failure signature. An obvious algorithmic approach would be
finding a minimal set of policy objects that covers risk models presented as a bipartite
graph. This general set cover problem is known to be NP-complete [52].
7.4.2 Existing algorithm: SCORE
We first take into account a greedy approximation algorithm used by SCORE [62]
system that attempts to solve the min set coverage problem and that offers O(logn)-
approximation to the optimal solution [62], where n is the number of affected elements
(e.g., EPG pairs in our problem). We first explain the SCORE algorithm and further
discuss its limitation.
Algorithm. The greedy algorithm in the SCORE system picks policy objects to maxi-
mize two utility values—(i) hit ratio and (ii) coverage ratio—computed for each shared
risk. We first introduce a few concepts in order to define them precisely under our
switch risk model. The same logic can be applied to the controller risk model.
Let Gi be a set of EPG pairs that depend on a shared risk i, Oi be a subset of Gi
in which EPG pairs are marked as fail (observations) due to failed edges between the
EPG pairs and the shared risk i, and F be the failure signature, a set of all observations,
i.e., F =
⋃
Oi for all i. For shared risk i, a hit ratio, hi is then defined as:
hi = |Gi∩Oi|/|Gi|= |Oi|/|Gi|
In other words, a hit ratio is a fraction of EPG pairs that are observations out of all
EPG pairs that depend on a shared risk. A hit ratio is 1 when all EPG pairs that depend
on a shared risk are marked as fail. And a coverage ratio, ci is defined as:
ci = |Gi∩Oi|/|F |= |Oi|/|F |
A coverage ratio denotes a fraction of failed EPG pairs associated with a shared risk
from the failure signature.
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The algorithm chooses shared risks whose hit ratio is above some fixed threshold
value. Next, given the set of selected shared risks, the algorithm outputs those shared
risks that have the highest coverage ratio values and that maximize the number of
explained observations.
Limitation. The algorithm treats a shared risk with a small hit ratio as noise and simply
ignores it. However, in our network policy fault localization problem, we observe that
while some policy objects such as filter have a small hit ratio (≈ 0.01), they are indeed
responsible for the outage of some EPG pairs. The algorithm excludes those objects,
which results in a huge accuracy loss (results in §7.6.2).
It turns out that not all EPG pairs that depend on the object are present in the failure
signature. For instance, suppose that 100 EPG pairs depend on a filter, which needs
100 TCAM rules. In this case, if one TCAM rule is missing, a hit ratio of the filter
is 0.01. This can happen if installing rules for those EPG pairs is conducted with a
time gap. For instance, 99 EPG pairs are configured first, and the 100th EPG pair is a
newly-added service, hence configured later.
To make it worse, in reality the hit ratio can vary significantly too. In the previous
example, if 95 TCAM rules are impacted, the hit ratio is 0.95. The wide variation of hit
ratio values can occur due to (1) switch TCAM overflow; (2) TCAM corruption [112]
that causes bit errors on a specific field in a TCAM rule or across TCAM rules; and
(3) software bugs [105] that modify object’s value wrong at controller or switch agent.
While the SCORE algorithm allows change of a threshold value to handle noisy input
data, such a static mechanism helps little in solving the problem at hand, confirmed by
our evaluation results in §7.6.
7.4.3 Proposed algoirthm: Scout
We propose Scout algorithm that actively takes into account policy objects whose hit
ratio percentage is less than 100% and thus overcomes the limitation of the SCORE
algorithm. Basically, our algorithm also greedily picks the faulty objects and outputs
hypothesis that has a minimal set of objects most likely explains all the observations
in a failure signature.
Algorithm 1 shows the core part of our fault localization algorithm. The algorithm
takes failure signature F and risk model R as input. F has a set of observations, e.g.,
EPG pairs marked as fail in the switch risk model. For each observation in F , the algo-
rithm obtains a list of policy objects with fail edges to that observation and computes
the utility values (i.e., hit and coverage ratios) for all those objects (lines 6-10). Then,
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Algorithm 1 Scout (F, R, C)
1: . F : failure signature, R: risk model, C: change logs
2: . P: unexplained set, Q: explained set, H: hypothesis
3: P←F; Q←;; H←;
4: while P 6= ; do
5: K←; . K: a set of shared risks







11: f aul t ySet←pickCandidates(K)
12: if f aul t ySet = ; then
13: break
14: end if
15: a f f ec ted←GetNodes( f aul t ySet,R)
16: R←Prune(a f f ec ted,R)
17: P← P \a f f ec ted; Q←Q
⋃
a f f ec ted
18: H←H
⋃
f aul t ySet
19: end while
20: if P 6= ; then








based on the utility values of shared risks in the model, the algorithm picks a subset of
the shared risks and treats them as faulty (line 11 and Algorithm 2). In Algorithm 2, if
the hit ratio of a shared risk is 1, the risk is included in a candidate risk set (lines 3-7);
and then from the set, the shared risks that have the highest coverage ratio values are
finally chosen; i.e., a set of shared risks that covers a maximum number of unexplained
observations (line 8).
If f aul t ySet is not empty, all EPG pairs that have an edge to any shared risk in the
f aul t ySet are pruned from the model (lines 15-16), and failed EPG pairs (observa-




3: for risk r ∈ riskVector do
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H = { F2, F3 }
Figure 7.5: An illustration of SCOUT algorithm using a switch risk model.
Edges and nodes in red color are fail and those in black are success. Note
that h refers to hit ratio and c to coverage ratio.
tions) are moved from unexplained to explained (line 17). Finally, all the shared risks
in the f aul t ySet are added to the hypothesis set, H . This process repeats until either
there are no more observations left unexplained or when f aul t ySet is empty.
Some observations may remain unexplained because the shared risks associated
with those observations have a hit ratio less than 1 and thus are not selected during
the above candidate selection procedure. To handle the remaining unexplained obser-
vations, the Scout algorithm searches logs about changes made to objects (which are
obtained from the controller), and selects the objects to which some actions are re-
cently applied (lines 21-24 in Algorithm 1). Despite its simplicity, this heuristic makes
huge improvement in accuracy (§7.6.2).
Example. Figure 7.5 shows an example of how the Scout algorithm works. The
lines 4-19 in Algorithm 1 cover the following: (i) filter F2 is identified as a candi-
date because it has the highest coverage ratio among the shared risks with a hit ratio of
1; (ii) all the EPG pairs that depend on F2 are pruned from the model; (iii) and F2 is
added to hypothesis. The lines 21-24 ensure that the algorithm adds filter F3 (assuming
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Event correlation engineL-T equivalence checker







• Build controller and switch risk models
• Augment the models with failure data
• Run Scout fault localization algorithm
Most likely 
root causes
Figure 7.6: Overview of Scout system.
F3 is lately modified) to the hypothesis since there are no shared risks with a hit ratio
of 1.
7.5 Scout System
We present Scout system that can conduct an end-to-end analysis from fault local-
ization of policy objects to physical-level root cause diagnosis. The system mainly
consists of (i) fault localization engine and (ii) event correlation engine. The former
runs the proposed algorithm in §7.4.3 and produces policy objects (i.e., hypothesis)
that are likely to be responsible for policy violation of EPG pairs. The latter correlates
the hypothesis and two system-level logs from the controller and network devices,
and produces the most-likely root causes at physical level that caused object failures.
Our prototype is written in about 1,000 lines of Python code. We collect the logical
network policy model and its change logs from Cisco’s application centric controller,
and switch TCAM rules and the device fault logs from Nexus 9000 series switches.
Figure 7.6 illustrates the overall architecture of Scout system.
7.5.1 Physical-level root cause diagnosis
Knowing root causes at a physical level such as control channel disruption, TCAM
overflow, bugs, system crashes, etc. is as equally important as fixing failed objects in
the network policy. In general, when a trouble ticket is raised, the current practice is
to narrow down possible root causes by analyzing system logs such as fault logs from
network devices. However, a majority in a myriad of log data is often irrelevant to the
caused failure. Filtering out such noises can be done to some extent by correlating the
logs with the generation time of the trouble ticket, but not effective enough to reduce
search space.
The event correlation engine shown in Figure 7.6 is a systematic and automated
approach to the above problem. The engine correlates the fault logs from network de-
vices, the change logs from the network policy controller and the hypothesis generated
from the fault localization engine. It then infers the most likely physical-level root
causes through the correlation.
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The engine works in three simple steps: (i) Using the hypothesis, it first identifies a
set of change logs that it has to examine; (ii) with the timestamps of those change logs,
it then narrows down the relevant faulty logs (those that are logged before the policy
changes and keep alive); and (iii) it finally associates impacted policy objects with the
fault(s) found in the relevant fault logs and outputs them.
The engine is pre-configured with signatures for known faults (e.g., disconnected
switch, TCAM overflow), composed by network admins with their domain knowledge
and prior experience. When fault logs match a signature, faults are identified and
associated with the impacted policy objects. Otherwise, the objects are tagged with
‘unknown’. Note that signatures can be flexibly added to the engine, and the system’s
ability would be naturally enhanced with more signatures.
7.5.2 Example usecases
We explain three realistic use cases in a testbed and demonstrate the workflow of our
system and its efficacy on fault localization. For this purpose, we use the network
policy for the 3-tier web service shown in Figure 7.1(a). We first test a TCAM overflow
case by continously adding one new filter after another to the Contract:App-DB object.
For the other two cases, we make a switch not respond to the controller in the middle
of updates, by silently dropping packets to the switch. Note that across all cases, we
let the switch generate 1000s of noisy logs in addition to the actual fault log.
TCAM overflow. Due to TCAM overflow, several filters were not deployed at TCAM.
The switch under test generated fault logs that indicate TCAM overflow when its
TCAM utilization was beyond a certain level. Our system first localized the faulty
filter objects with risk models, correlated them with the change logs for ‘add filter’
instruction, and subsequently the change logs with the fault logs. Our system had the
fault signature of TCAM overflow, so it was able to match the fault logs with that
signature and tag those failed filters accordingly.
Unresponsive switch. In this use case, the switch under test became unresponsive
while the controller was sending the ‘add filter’ instructions to the switch. The equiv-
alence checker reported that the rules associated with some filters are missing. Then,
the Scout algorithm localized those filters as faulty objects. Using filter creation times
from the change logs and the fault logs that indicate the switch was inactive (both
maintained at the controller), the correlation engine was able to detect that filters were
created when the switch was inactive.
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Too many missing rules. As a variant of the above scenario, we pushed a policy
with a large number of policy objects onto the unresponsive switch. We found out that
more than 300K missing rules were reported by the equivalence checker. Without fault
localization, it is extremely challenging for network admins to correlate and identify
the set of underlying objects that are fundamentally responsible for the problem. Scout
narrowed it down and reported the unresponsive switch as the root cause behind these
huge number of rule misses.
7.6 Evaluation
We evaluate Scout in terms of (i) suspect set reduction, (ii) accuracy, and (iii) scala-
bility. We mean by suspect set reduction a ratio, γ between the size of hypothesis (a
set of objects reported by Scout) and the number of all objects that failed EPG pairs
rely on; the smaller the ratio is, the less objects network admins should examine. As
for accuracy, we use precision (|G∩H|/|H|) and recall (|G∩H|/|G|) where H is hy-
pothesis and G is a set for ground truth. A higher precision means fewer false positives
and a higher recall means fewer false negatives. Finally, we evaluate scalability via
measuring running times across different network sizes.
7.6.1 Evaluation environment
Setup. We conduct our evaluation under two settings.
Simulation: We build our simulation setup with network policies used in our pro-
duction cluster that comprises about 30 switches and 100s of servers. The cluster
dataset contains 6 VRFs, 615 EPGs, 386 contracts, and 160 filters.
Testbed: We build a network policy that consists of 36 EPGs, 24 contracts, 9 filters,
and 100 EPG pairs, based on the statistics of the number of EPGs and their dependency
on other policy objects obtained from the above cluster dataset.
Fault injection. We define two types of faults that cause inconsistency between net-
work policy and switch TCAM rules. (i) Full object fault means that all TCAM rules
associated with an object are missing. (ii) Partial object fault is a fault that makes some
of the EPG pairs that depend on an object fail to communicate. That is, some TCAM
rules associated with the object are missing. For both simulation and experiment, we
randomly generate the two types of faults with equal weight.
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Figure 7.7: Suspect set reduction.
7.6.2 Results
Suspect set reduction. We first compare the size of hypothesis with the number of
policy objects (a suspect set) that EPG pairs in failure depend on. We use the metric
γ defined earlier for this comparison. Figure 7.7 shows the suspect set reduction ratio
in the simulation and testbed. We generate 1,500 faults of object in the simulation and
200 faults of object in the testbed; for each object fault, we compute the total number
of objects, that the EPG pairs impacted by the faulty object depend on. From the figure,
we see γ is less than 0.08 in most cases. Scout reports at maximum 10 policy objects
in the hypothesis whereas without fault localization network admin should suspect as
many as a thousand policy objects. This smaller γ value means that network admins
need to examine a relatively small number of objects to fix inconsistencies between a
network policy and deployed TCAM rules. Therefore, Scout can greatly help reduce
repair time and necessary human resources.
Accuracy. While it is great that Scout produces a handful of objects that require inves-
tigation, a more important aspect is that the hypothesis should contain more number of
truly faulty objects and less number of non-faulty objects. We study this using preci-
sion and recall. In addition, we compare Scout’s accuracy with SCORE’s. We use two
different error threshold values for SCORE to see if changing parameters would help
improve its accuracy.
Figures 7.8(a) and 7.8(b) show recall and precision of fault localization with multi-
ple number of simultaneous faulty objects (x-axis) in the switch risk model. From the

































Figure 7.8: Fault localization performance on switch risk model. X in SCORE-

































Figure 7.9: Fault localization performance on controller risk model with faulty
policy objects across switches. X in SCORE-X is an error threshold set for hit
ratio. Each data point is an average over 30 runs.
figures, we observe Scout’s recall is 20-30% better than SCORE’s without any compro-
mise on precision. The error threshold values make little change in the performance
of SCORE. Also, the high recall of Scout suggests that Scout can always find most
faulty objects. Moreover, high precision (close to 0.9) suggests fewer false positives.
For instance, with 10 faulty objects in the network policy, Scout reports on average one
additional object as faulty. In Figures 7.9(a) and 7.9(b) we observe similar trends for
the controller risk model.
Figures 7.10(a) and 7.10(b) compare the accuracy of Scout and SCORE with up
to 10 simultaneous faults in the testbed. SCORE’s error threshold is set to 1. From
the figures, we observe Scout’s recall is much better (20-50%) than SCORE’s while
its precision is comparable to SCORE’s. Scout detects all faulty objects when there





























Figure 7.10: Fault localization performance when policy objects fail to be de-
ployed in a switch. Each data point is an average over 10 runs.
are less than four faults, i.e., with 100% recall and about 98% precision. When there
are five or more faults, Scout’s accuracy (especially, recall) begins to decrease. The
difference in accuracy between the simulation and testbed setup is mainly because of
a low degree of risk sharing among EPG pairs in the testbed, when compared to the
simulation dataset obtained from the production cluster.
Scalability. We measure running time of Scout under a controller risk model from the
network policy deployed in 10 switches in the production cluster. We scale the model
up to 500 switches by adding new EPG and switch pairs. We observe that Scout takes
about 45 and 130 seconds with 200 and 500 switches respectively, on a machine with
a 4-core 2.6 GHz CPU and 16GB memory.
7.7 Limitations
Routing policy deployment failures. In general, there are mainly two types of net-
work policies: security and routing policies. Low-level rules like access control list,
are installed into edge switches based on security policies, and enforce which traffic
to drop, forward, or modify. On the other hand, routing policies enforce which path
the traffic should follow between an ingress and an egress edge switch. In this chapter,
we present Scout, an end-to-end system that localizes faults while deploying security
policies. Scout can be extended to provide support for routing policy deployment fail-
ures as well. This is important because, an edge switch processes traffic as defined by
both routing and security policy. Perhaps, similar to Scout, we can introduce models
that capture routing policy deployment failures, run a fault localization algorithm, and
Chapter 7. Fault Localization in Large-Scale Network Policy Deployment 112
localize the minimal set of policy objects that explains most of the routing failures.
Maintaining signatures of known faults. The event correlation engine infers the most
likely physical-level failures, like a disconnected switch, TCAM overflow, etc., which
might be the root cause for policy deployment failures. In this work, we pre-configured
the engine with signatures of all known physical-level failures. When a spurious net-
work event is detected, network fault logs are matched against the signatures, and infer
the root cause. However, in practice, updating (add, delete, or modify) a signature list
requires domain knowledge and prior experience. For now, we manually update the
signatures, instead of automatically creating them.
7.8 Summary
Network policy abstraction enables flexible and intuitive policy management. How-
ever it also makes network troubleshooting prohibitively hard when network policies
are not deployed as expected. In this chapter we introduced and solved a network pol-
icy fault localization problem where the goal is to identify faulty policy objects that
have low-level rules go missing from network devices and thus are responsible for net-
work outages and policy violations. We formulated the problem with risks models and
proposed a greedy algorithm that accurately pinpoints faulty policy objects and built
Scout, an end-to-end system that automatically pinpoints not only faulty policy objects
but also physical-level failures.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
To conclude, this chapter outlines the areas of future works and summarizes thesis
contributions.
8.1 Future work
Per-packet logs support. PathDump and SwitchPointer make a case for shifting de-
bugging functionality from networks to end-hosts. Because storing individual packet
header has a high latency and throughput bottleneck at high line rates (e.g., 10Gig,
40Gig), end-host agent aggregate all packets within a flow and store records on a per-
flow (5-tuple) basis. However, some debugging applications that run SQL-like queries
on various packet header fields require per-packet logs, therefore may not fully ben-
efit with flow-level statistics. For example, queries that execute on custom packet
header fields (defined to enable specific functionality), like VXLAN header fields in
CONGA [19], TPP fields in [51], etc.
Can we provide support to capture, store, and execute queries on per-packet logs
while respecting end-host resources? Some possibilities are integrating advanced data
structures advocated in trumpet [71], use hardware-based packet capture [47], or filter
packet headers that represents a spurious network event in the hardware. Such a per-
packet log capability at end-hosts would enable debugging a class of network problems
in addition to those currently supported by PathDump and SwitchPointer.
Universal packet trajectory tracing. In a large-scale data center, there exist hundreds
of paths between a pair of end-hosts. While debugging network problems, knowing
the packet path greatly reduces debugging space [44, 112, 49, 22, 88]. Some of the
techniques to trace packet trajectory are: enforcing path-let routing [110], embedding
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each linkID that a packet traverse into the packet header [51], collect per-packet per-
switch logs [47], and link sampling technique like CherryPick. In this thesis, based
on a link sampling technique, we provide OpenFlow rules for tracing a packet path
in two popular topologies, fat-tree and VL2. We also showed this technique requires
minimal switch rules and small packet header space (one VLAN tag for 4-hops), so
that CherryPick works in a network with commodity SDN switches. However, due to
packet header space and switch hardware limitation, CherryPick may not support other
topologies like DCell, BCube, HyperX, etc.
We envision this limitations would go away with the emergence of programmable
hardware. So, a promising future work would be to come up with a system for tracing
packet trajectory irrespective to underlying network topology. The system should ex-
ploit topology characteristics, and automatically generate switch flow rules, such that,
it uses optimal switch resources and packet header space. One possibility is to lever-
age switch hardware programmability, and define a packet parser, match-action rules,
and packet header bits that work for a specific topology. Such a system abstracts the
underlying network topology’s details, and ease operators while debugging network
problems.
Policy for maximum resource utilization. Typically, multiple tenants share the net-
work infrastructure. Tenants could be application owners in a cloud, business units in
an enterprise network, or departments in a campus network. In addition to the usual
operations, a SDN controller converts a tenant policy to low-level rules, and also guar-
antees performance isolation. For example, access control rules derived from a policy
are deployed in edge switches, as if the customer is the only one using the switch
resources. From the cloud provider’s perspective, in addition to optimizing resource
allocation for a single tenant, the provider should also satisfy other tenants such that
resource utilization is maximized.
Can we dynamically recommend a network policy that best meets both tenant needs
(security, isolation) and cloud provider requirements (maximum resource utilization)?
Perhaps, one approach is to build a global model similar to bipartite models in Scout,
that captures tenant policies and their resources utilization, run optimization algorithms
on the model, and recommend a win-win policy to the tenants.
SwitchPointer on-chip support. We envision that a hardware prototype that imple-
ments SwitchPointer pointer would be the good next step to realize our idea — dis-
tributed switch storage as distributed directory service. It would eliminate the perfor-
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mance limitations of the current software versions we have built. One approach is to
study the available constructs (hashing, per-packet memory update) in programmable
hardware such as P4 and NetFPGA, if necessary also implement new constructs.
8.2 Contributions
Monitoring and debugging data plane problems in large-scale networks is complex.
Existing solutions operate at one of the two extremes — systems running at end-hosts
(more resources but less visibility into the network) or at network switches (more
visibility, but limited resources). This thesis calls for a different approach for net-
work debugging: it carefully partitions the monitoring and debugging functionality
between network elements and end-hosts. Towards this direction, this thesis presents
CherryPick, PathDump, and SwitchPointer, together integrates in-network visibility and
resources and programmability of end-hosts. In specific, we showed that an end-host
based network debugger, PathDump gain in-network visibility with SwitchPointer (with
its pointers to end-hosts at switches) and CherryPick (with its packet trajectory tracing
technique), and allows to debug a large class of network problems which includes those
that are hard or even infeasible to debug with existing systems.
While CherryPick, PathDump, and SwitchPointer focus on debugging problems in
the network data plane, Scout deals with network policy deployment failures. Scout
is an end-to-end system that first localizes faulty policy objects, then conduct analysis
to identify physical level failure; a possible root cause for objects become faulty. The
impact of Scout remains to be seen. Scout work is tested and evaluated on Cisco’s
SDN solution for data center networks — Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) —
integration of Scout into Cisco’s in-house debugging tool is part of the future plan.
8.3 Towards automated network debugging
A fully automated debugging tool — a key component in self-driving networks —
should detect, locate, and find root cause of network problems. In specific, it should tell
about where and what is the problem, instead of using human skills and expertise which
might take many man-hours. This thesis does not target "automated" debugging but
rather builds a framework to simplify the debugging process. We hope this thesis would
guide network admins while designing debugging tools for self-driving networks.
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